

For Reference

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

Ex libris
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAENSIS



THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
A CRITIQUE OF THE COUNTER CULTURE

by



DONALD STEWART ANDREWS


A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1972



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Alberta Library

<https://archive.org/details/Andrews1972>

1972
6

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A CRITIQUE OF THE COUNTER CULTURE" submitted by Donald Stewart Andrews in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis and criticism of two prominent works; Charles A. Reich's The Greening of America and Theodore Roszak's The Making of a Counter Culture. These works advance the claim that "hippies" and other dissident elements (collectively referred to as the "counter culture") constitute a revolutionary social movement capable of totally transforming North American society through "revolution by consciousness"--a new form of political action.

In the first and second chapters, we analyze The Greening of America and The Making of a Counter Culture. This is chiefly a task of exposition and clarification. In chapter three, the "revolution by consciousness" thesis is examined in light of the work by eminent thinkers on revolution and social change. Chapter four deals with problems of consistency of thought and the validity of arguments. The last chapter presents a suggestion for an alternative avenue of research. A number of definitional preliminaries to such research are explored, and then findings are presented which would seem to controvert Reich and Roszak's assessment of the counter culture as a social movement. It is concluded that to abandon the traditional modes of political action in favour of "revolution by consciousness" would be impolitic on the basis of the evidence and arguments presented by Reich and Roszak.

PREFACE

In this thesis I will explore the popular notion that the "counter culture" (e.g. the alienated and disaffected young, "hippie" drop-outs, and, perhaps, certain elements of the "New-Left.") constitutes a nascent social movement capable of totally transforming the existing social order through the unprecedented means of "revolution by consciousness."

For the purposes of analysis and criticism, I have selected the two most popular and prominent works expounding the "revolution by consciousness" thesis: Charles A. Reich's The Greening of America and Theodore Roszak's The Making of a Counter Culture. These selections feature comprehensive criticisms of the existing social order and attempt to demonstrate that the "counter culture" is a desirable, and, it seems, an inevitable alternative to the prevailing social order. The authors claim that all previous means for achieving social change have failed, and furthermore, that the continuance of these methods and policies will lead to Fascism. They call for an abandonment of the "traditional" modes of political action on the basis of their analysis of the revolutionary character of the counter culture.

The analysis and criticism of The Greening of America and The Making of a Counter Culture presented below can be divided into four main parts. The first and second chapters will be devoted to the exposition of the substance of

Reich and Roszak's arguments. In the third chapter, the concept of "revolution by consciousness" will be examined in the light of the work of the eminent thinkers on revolution and social change. I will then devote a chapter to problems with consistency of thought and the validity of the arguments presented in the two works. Finally, I will attempt to evaluate Reich and Roszak's characterizations of the counter culture in the light of a number of findings drawn from journalists, social scientists, and from my independent work in the field and to suggest further avenues for research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I	THE GREENING OF AMERICA	1
CHAPTER II	THE MAKING OF A COUNTER CULTURE . .	34
CHAPTER III	REVOLUTION	74
CHAPTER IV	REICH AND ROSZAK: A CRITIQUE	104
	The Greening of America	
	The Making of a Counter Culture	
CHAPTER V	SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH . . .	131
BIBLIOGRAPHY		166

CHAPTER I

THE GREENING OF AMERICA

The Greening of America¹ is both a critique of American society and an attempt to demonstrate the inevitability and desirability of a particular form of revolutionary change for that society. It should be noted, however, that although the author, Charles A. Reich, purports to be dealing only with problems characteristic of the United States, there is nothing which precludes the application of his analysis and criticism to any industrialized, technological, and bureaucratic society -- including Canada. As a critique of industrial and technological society The Greening of America is by no means sui generis; its antecedents are to be found in such works as Galbraith's The New Industrial State,² Riesman's The Lonely Crowd,³ and especially in Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society⁴. Sections dealing with "the loss of self" are reminiscent of The Organization Man⁵ and The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit,⁶ while those sections in which Reich sets out his values, and those of the "counter culture", are highly suggestive of the Romantics.⁷

Reich devotes a great deal of The Greening of America to an analysis of what he terms "the American crisis".⁸ At first an enumeration of seven problems is presented as constituting "the American crisis".⁹ These seven problems make up a descriptive component which is then portrayed as merely

the overt manifestation of a deeper crisis in "understanding". It is by linking "understanding" to the concept of "consciousness" that Reich integrates the descriptive and evaluative material with the comprehensive explanatory and predictive attempts of The Greening of America.¹⁰ What emerges from this synthesis is a deterministic model of social change based upon the now famous concept of "consciousness".¹¹ Reich submits this model in order to explain the development of "the American crisis" and as evidence for the inevitability of a new consciousness (Consciousness III), which, by eliminating the "crisis of understanding", will solve the seven problems constituting its overt manifestations.

At the heart of The Greening of America, lies Reich's concept of "consciousness". Reich traces the development of "the American crisis" by means of an exposition of what he terms "Consciousness I" and "Consciousness II".

According to Reich, "Consciousness I is the traditional outlook of the American farmer, small businessman, and worker who is trying to get ahead".¹² Consciousness I embodies principles such as the pursuit of individual happiness (typically, through competition, hard work, and self-denial), and a rejection of constraints such as those imposed by class, social custom, and community ties. The movement away from communal relationships exemplified by the family, guilds, and village life has also been dealt with, more extensively, and in greater depth, by scholars such as Tönnies, Maine, Durkheim, Duguit, and Gierke. Their work, and that of Reich, emphasizes

the effects of factors such as technological developments and the division of labour upon traditional customs, social patterns, and the law.¹³

Reich views the collapse of the traditional social order and the liberation of the individual from feudal ties as beneficial in the context of the opportunities presented by frontier America.

The crucial thing was to release the individual energy so long held back by rigid social customs and hierarchical forms. Each newly sovereign individual could be the source of his own achievement and fulfillment. One worked for oneself, not for society.¹⁴

Furthermore, the new forms of production, which led to this breakdown of the feudal order, also benefited men by freeing them from static toil through a more efficient utilization of labour and resources by means of technology and organization.

Although the new forms of production and the concomitant social reorganization resulted in certain material benefits (albeit unequally distributed), there were costs for this increase in productive capacity. The rise of the money economy, notes Reich, put an end to the "idyllic" feudal relationships and replaced them with relations based upon an impersonal "cash-nexus". Mechanization, specialization, and mass production are the products of, and indeed, are made possible by a money economy in a free market system.

Man became alienated from himself as money, not inner needs, called the tune. Man began to defer or abandon his real needs, and increasingly his wants became subject to outside manipulation. Losing both his

work-essence and his need-essence, man was no longer a unique individual but an extension of the production-consumption system.¹⁵

A second consequence of industrialism, market exploitation, and technology was the demise of the random, spontaneous¹⁶ burgeoning life that seemed so typical of frontier America. The rise of efficiency as an overriding societal value was accompanied by the rise of a new managerial hierarchy and the division of American society into two classes: the powerful and the powerless. The destruction of the American dream was not a communist or anarchist plot, writes Reich.

They the killers of the American dream did not have beards and bombs, foreign accents and manifestoes. They were, these enemies of the original American ideal, the great names: Vanderbilt, Carnegie, Harriman, Ford. The forces of market exploitation and technology, active through them, cut down democracy, independence, and the pursuit of happiness, and fostered instead a new managerial order, a hierarchy of power and privilege that replaced communal values with anti-social "success" and with inhuman science.¹⁷

Consciousness I individuals were on guard for any misuse of governmental power, but totally blind to the reality of private power: "...power to plan the economy to decide what is to be produced, to fix prices, to regulate essential services, including the distribution of news and information (so vital to the working of a democracy)...."¹⁸ The myths of Consciousness I, as exemplified by Horatio Alger, allowed the American people to be manipulated by the more organized forces of society. In conclusion, Reich states:

It Consciousness I could not understand that "private property" in the hands of a corporation was a synonym for quasi-governmental power, far different from the property of an individual. It could not understand

the crucial point that collective action against corporate power would not have been a step towards collectivisation, but an effort to preserve democracy in a society that had already been collectivized.¹⁹

Although Reich criticizes the inability of Consciousness I to deal with the rising tide of corporate power, he retains a fondness for an idealized pre-industrial American existence; an existence which includes Jefferson and the western cowboy, but which ignores Hamilton, and disregards a history of genocide concerning the native inhabitants of North America.

Whitman [in his poem "Song of Myself"] could be speaking for today's youth. But he was also summing up one side of the original American dream -- the dream shared by the colonists and the immigrants, by Jefferson, Emerson, the Puritan preachers and the western cowboy -- a dream premised on human dignity, a dignity that made each man an equal being in a spiritual sense, and envisioned a community based upon individual dignity.²⁰

This nostalgia for the dreams of Consciousness I is not accompanied by a similar affection for the myths and aspirations of Consciousness II. In fact, Consciousness II absorbs the full brunt of major criticism in The Greening of America.

The matrix of Consciousness II is in the efforts at reform associated with the populists and the Progressive era. The source of this reform movement can be traced, in part, to literature at the turn of the Century such as Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, and later, to works such as Stephen Crane's Maggie: A Girl of the Streets, and Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath. Reich deals only peripherally with these early attempts at reform: his chief concern is with the New Deal and what he feels to be its disastrous consequences. The values underlying the New Deal are described as centering

around organization, planning, regulation, the maximum use of technology and science. As Reich perceives the New Deal: "It believed in a meritocracy of equal opportunity and ability, unencumbered by irrational forms of prejudice and discrimination".²¹ The New Deal created a hierarchy matching the private corporate hierarchy:²² "For each piece of regulatory legislation a large, specialized government agency was established, and at the same time the regular executive departments of the government were greatly expanded".²³ The hallmarks of the New Deal were: (1) regulation of the economy, (2) balancing business power by government and union power, (3) providing minimum welfare to the losers in the competitive struggle, and (4) government participation in social programs such as public housing, public works, and government subsidies.

Reich claims that the results of the New Deal were worse than the problems it was designed to combat. Not only did the New Deal preserve the system from the ravages of the Depression, but it preserved and compounded the system's problems as well. Individuals had lost power to private organizations. In order to combat the results of this power vacuum, government, labor unions, and farmers' groups were strengthened in an attempt to balance the power of private organizations. "Nothing came back to the people. If anything, the public organizations gained greater power over individuals than the private organizations had held previously".²⁴ The result of this attempt to balance public

and private power was not safety for the individual:

The final tragedy of the reform movement is that the power it created was amalgamated with the private power already in existence, and with the now overwhelming and terrible power of technology, to form the inhuman structure in which we now live -- the American Corporate State.²⁵

A full five chapters of The Greening of America are devoted to an indictment of Consciousness II. Although an exhaustive enumeration of the charges which Reich brings to bear against Consciousness II would be unnecessary for the purposes of this analysis, some account of this aspect of The Greening of America is relevant, both intrinsically (for much of Reich's argument for the desirability of Consciousness III hinges upon the undesirability of Consciousness II as he portrays it), and extrinsically, in that arguments for the inevitability of the revolution (Consciousness III) depend upon the plausibility of Reich's assertions about the contradictions in Consciousness II.

Reich maintains that "Consciousness II came into existence as a consequence of the disastrous failure of Consciousness I".²⁶ Although Consciousness I individuals retained their myths about unlimited opportunity and the inevitability of pecuniary benefits as rewards for honesty, perseverance, and self-reliance, the reality of America was typified by "...robber barons, business piracy, ruinous competition, unreliable products and false advertising, grotesque inequality, and the chaos of excessive individualism and the lack of coordination and planning...."²⁷ The response of Con-

sciousness II to the brutalities of industrial capitalism was to seek the coordination of social activity through a hierarchy and the re-establishment of authority and responsibility: "Consciousness I sacrificed for the individual good; now it seemed necessary to sacrifice for a common good".²⁸

Consciousness II is defined or delineated by reference to its institutional, administrative, and organizational characteristics. Form, not content, is what identifies a Consciousness II society. Thus, Reich can lump together entities as diverse as Fascist Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States on the basis of their common bureaucratic and administrative hierarchies. It should be noted that no attempt is made to differentiate between hierarchies on the basis of the sources of their authority, their accessibility to scrutiny, or their degree of autonomy from public control.

Individuals are also categorized on the basis of their commitment to reform or change through organization, institutional modification, or rational planning.

The categories of people in the general area of Consciousness II are very diverse, including businessmen (new type), liberal intellectuals, the educated professionals and technicians, middle class suburbanites, labor union leaders, Gene McCarthy supporters, blue-collar workers with newly purchased homes, old-line leftists, and members of the Communist Party, U.S.A.²⁹

Above all, Reich identifies Consciousness II as the embodiment of the "problem solving" approach to social problems. It is a point-of-view; a propensity to respond to the need for change in certain ways, which Reich attacks in

his critique of Consciousness II. The agents of Consciousness II invariably formulate problems in such a way that the source of trouble lies in the individual and the solution results from a "...greater commitment of individuals to the public interest, more social responsibility by private business, and, above all, by more affirmative government action -- regulation, planning, more of a welfare state, better and more rational administration and management".³⁰

Consciousness II believes in the central ideology of technology, the domination of man and environment by technique. Accordingly, science, technology, organization, and planning are prime values. Different groups within Consciousness II might disagree -- aircraft executives might think the nation should be dominated by machine and computer technology, while professors of English, horrified by this, would think the world should be dominated by rationally critical thought -- but the idea of domination is common to both, although neither would necessarily acknowledge that similarity. Throughout all of Consciousness II runs the theme that society will function best if it is planned, organized, rationalized, administered.³¹

In fact, Consciousness II is so permeated by "extrinsic" values that the individual comes to validate his "self" -- i.e., establishes his self-worth -- in terms of the roles and institutions which circumscribe his existence: the individual defines himself in terms of titles, office, respect, and honor derived from and associated with the organization to which he belongs. This externalization of self-worth Reich terms "loss of self".³²

Part of the "loss of self" manifests itself in conformity, non-commitment, and the refusal of Consciousness II individuals to question the regimentation of their society. A great deal of what Reich discusses under "The Lost Self"

is the product of a particular socialization process; although he would make the stronger claim that this process is the result of planned manipulation by the State.³³ Adherence to the prescribed way of life, according to Reich, is "...enforced by an elaborate system of official surveillance, including wiretapping, eavesdropping, invasions of privacy by police searchers, police photography of demonstrators, congressional investigations, and all of the other methods with which we have become familiar".³⁴ The picture painted of American society in The Greening of America is of totalitarianism: no aspect of life, public or private is absolved from scrutiny and regulation by the State.

Reich's portrait of the United States as a monolithic totalitarian State is developed in chapter five of The Greening of America, entitled "Anatomy of the Corporate State". The reader should not rely upon the generally accepted definitions of the Corporate State which find their origins in the experiences of Fascist Italy and in Portugal under Antonio de Salazar.³⁵ A major difference between the traditional conception of the Corporate State and Reich's version is that in the former the economic interests in society, both capital and labour, are subordinated to the Government, while the latter views Government as a sub-unit of the Corporate State.

It [the Corporate State] consists primarily of large industrial organizations, plus nonprofit institutions such as foundations and the educational system, all related to the whole as divisions to a business corporation. Government is only a part of the state, but Government coordinates it and provides a variety of needed services.... The State is subject neither to

democratic controls, constitutional limits, or legal regulation. Instead, the organizations in the Corporate State are motivated primarily by the demands of technology and of their own internal structure.³⁶

The rise of conglomerates and the tendency of "separate" parts of the "Corporate State" to follow identical policies with regard to such things as pricing, distribution, and working conditions is put forth by Reich as evidence for accepting his characterization of American society as monolithic and repressive. The allegation is also made that in the "Corporate State" "...most of the 'public' functions of government are actually performed by the 'private' sector of the economy;..." and conversely, that "...most 'government' functions are services performed by the private sector".³⁷

Administration (or more appropriately, an administrative hierarchy) is the means by which totalitarian control is exerted over almost all aspects of life in America. According to Reich, the "Corporate State" is at base an administrative state:

Lines of authority, responsibility, and supervision are established as clearly as possible; everyone is arranged in a hierarchy. Rules are drawn for every imaginable contingency, so that individual choice is minimized. Arrangements are made to check on what everyone does, to have reports and permanent records. The random, the irrational, and the alternative ways of doing things are banished.³⁸

Another attribute ascribed to administration is that of inherent elitism. Its hierarchical structure, argues, Reich, guarantees the emergence of a small ruling elite and a large group of followers who have no significant decision-making power.

While they [i.e., the electorate] continue to vote in political elections, they are offered little choice among candidates; all the major decisions about what is produced, what is consumed, how resources are allocated, the conditions of work, and so forth, are made administratively.³⁹

Administrative types have a propensity to seek middle-ground through consensus and compromise, thereby emasculating the alternatives; thus, the "administrative state" (i.e., the "Corporate State") "depoliticizes" society. Extremes are viewed as ipso facto undesirable: "That which refuses to be adjusted is considered by administration as 'deviance', a departure from the norm needing to be treated and cured".⁴⁰

Even the administrative "elite" is not truly political, for they are portrayed as essentially slaves to organization and technology.⁴¹ A "political" state, on Reich's view, "...is one in which differences, conflicts and cultural diversity are regarded as aspects of pluralism to be represented in the political process and allowed a life of their own within the body politic".⁴² The diversity which Reich seeks requires that lions lie down with lambs, or at least that they agree to refrain from eating all the sheep. This requirement is evidenced by the following passage from The Greening of America:

Thus political radicals, marijuana users, or culturally distinct groups would all coexist, have political voices, and contribute to the diversity and balance of the nation.⁴³

This conception of politics and a "political state" provides a key insight which will help to clarify Reich's position regarding the possibility of a society structured

along the lines of "Consciousness III".

"The foundation of Consciousness III is liberation".⁴⁴
 This "liberation" takes place through a conversion process the outer manifestation of which involves an abrupt change in the individual's behaviour patterns. "What happens is simply this: in a brief span of months, a student, seemingly conventional in every way, changes his haircut, his clothes, his habits, his interests, his political attitudes, his way of relating to other people, in short, his whole way of life".⁴⁵
 This behaviour change is also accompanied by a rejection of the goals, values, and expectations of the prevailing society. "The meaning of liberation is that the individual is free to build his own philosophy and values, his own life-style, and his own culture [sic.] from a new beginning".⁴⁶

At the individual level, Consciousness III rests upon a commitment to the absolute worth of every human being. Competition is disdained because it requires intersubjective standards for evaluation, and Consciousness III rejects the concept of excellence. In Consciousness III no one judges anyone else.

Someone may be a brilliant thinker, but he is not "better" at thinking than anyone else, he simply possesses his own excellence. A person who thinks very poorly is still excellent in his own way.⁴⁷

Reich asserts that the absence of standards for comparison and evaluation results in no one being rejected; it allows everyone to take pride in himself as well as to relate to others on an equal footing. Recognition and acceptance in

the Consciousness III community does not rest upon achievement but upon the uniqueness of each individual -- there are no rejects or "losers" in Consciousness III.

Consciousness III individuals are committed to "honesty": a concept with a special extended meaning which includes what might be termed "frankness", "authenticity", or lack of "pretense". Role-playing, etiquette, and other conventions are eyed with deep suspicion, for they are viewed as instruments of hypocrisy. Others must be accepted as they are; similarly,

It is equally wrong to alter oneself for someone else's sake; by being one's true self one offers others the most; one offers them something honest, genuine, and, more important, something for them to respond to, to be evoked by.⁴⁸

Relationships based upon function, role, authority, or subservience are seen as impersonal, and therefore, "dishonest".

"Honesty" also demands that obligations and commitments be abrogated after the individual no longer feels disposed to honor them. Some people might question the possibility of society without rights, duties, and obligations; others might deny the desirability of such a society:

But to observe duties toward others, after the feelings are gone, is no virtue and may even be a crime. Loyalty is valued but not artificial duty. Thus the new generation looks with suspicion on "obligations" and contractual relations between people; but it believes that honesty can produce far more genuine relationships than the sterile ones it observes among the older generation. To most people, there is something frightening about the notion that no oath, no law, no promise, no indebtedness holds people together when the feeling is gone. But for the new generation that is merely recognition of the truth about human beings.⁴⁹

By getting rid of "artificial" relationships, i.e., those based upon obligation and contract, Consciousness III makes way for "real" relationships those based upon friendship, companionship, and love.

Another requirement that is imposed by the principle of "honesty" is that the individual resist self-sacrifice for higher principles. No matter how tempting it might be to undergo deprivations for noble causes the Consciousness III individual will not falter:

A Consciousness III person will not study law to help society, if law is not what he wants to do with his life, nor will he do harm to others in order to promote some good, nor will he deny himself the experiences of life for any cause.⁵⁰

There is no limit, however, to the risks that a Consciousness III individual will take in pursuing objectives which he is personally committed to. He will not limit himself to token contributions, nor will he leave the task to others. Instead, the Consciousness III person votes with his body: "Consciousness III feels that, if he is to be true to himself, he must respond with himself".⁵¹ Direct action, through demonstrations, sit-ins, and picketing, as well as through activities such as teaching in ghetto schools, is the style of Consciousness III politics.

The final attribute of Consciousness III is its rejection of rational thought.

Nothing so outrages the Consciousness II intellectual as this seeming rejection of reason itself. But Consciousness III has been exposed to some rather bad examples of reason, including the intellectual justifications of the Cold War and the Vietnam War. At any rate, Consciousness III believes it essential to get

free of what is now accepted as rational thought. It believes that "reason" tends to leave out too many factors and values -- especially those that cannot readily be put into words and categories.⁵²

Consciousness III "...believes that thought can be 'non-linear', spontaneous, disconnected".⁵³

At least two questions remain to be answered: (1) How has a movement so antithetical to Consciousness II arisen, given the alleged repressive and totalitarian nature of American society? (2) Why will a society predicated upon Consciousness III principles displace Consciousness II society? The answers that Reich gives to these questions are found in two chapters of The Greening of America entitled "The Machine Begins to Self-Destruct" and "Revolution by Consciousness".

The rise of Consciousness III, according to Reich, is the first stage of a spontaneous rebellion which will undermine the Corporate State and tear apart the social fabric.

It is our theory that the State itself is now bringing about its own destruction. The machine itself has begun to do the work of revolution. The State is now generating forces that will accomplish what no revolutionaries could accomplish by themselves. And there is nothing the State can do, by repression or power, to prevent these forces from bringing it down.⁵⁴

The forces that are destroying Consciousness II society do their work by "converting" more and more individuals to Consciousness III principles. The days of political activism are over. Self-sacrifice in political movements, legal reform, and power politics have been tried, states Reich, and "...it is time to realize that this form of activism merely affirms the State". "Must we wait for fascism before we rea-

lize that political activism has failed"?⁵⁵ The only form of revolution which does not subvert the objectives and principles which it seeks to further is revolution by consciousness:

Consciousness is capable of changing and destroying the Corporate State, without violence, without seizure of political power, without overthrow of any existing group of people. The new generation, by experimenting with action at the level of consciousness, has shown the way to the one method of change that will work in today's post-industrial society: changing consciousness. It is only by changing individual lives that we can seize power from the State.⁵⁶

It is at this point that Reich advances another view of the relationship between history and consciousness; one that differs from his earlier Marxian approach.⁵⁷ This alternative viewpoint resembles the Idealism of Fichte and Hegel as the following passage suggests.

In the Middle Ages, when a very different consciousness prevailed, neither technology nor the market was permitted to dominate other social values, no matter how great the "logic" of technology.⁵⁸ (My emphasis).

According to this view, "...culture controls the economic and political machine, not vice versa".⁵⁹ The primacy of consciousness, and the possibility of manipulating the structure of society is never questioned by Reich, as evidenced by the following passage:

Thus, in a long-run sense, technology represents a choice (not an inevitability, as Ellul suggested), and we can make a new choice whenever we are ready to do so.... Perhaps the culture just now being developed by the new generation -- the new emphasis on imagination, the senses, community, and the self -- is the first real choice made by any Western people since the end of the Middle Ages.⁶⁰

Youth has been the first group to see through the deceptions of the old consciousness. They were the first to experience the affluence of the post World War II era and to realize that wealth and status were not commensurate with happiness. The expectations raised by the myths of Consciousness II were met with meaninglessness, loneliness, and alienation. Society asked for total belief; when the discrepancy between myth and reality became apparent through the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam movements, widespread disillusionment followed. Reich notes that this gap in belief was solidified by the inflated assertions about the dangers of marijuana by adults, and the common knowledge about the drug's actual effects on the part of youth.

The major force producing Consciousness III, however, was the Vietnam War. The failure of the efforts to stop the war by protest produced some disillusionment, but its continuance in the face of widespread opposition provided a decision crisis for almost every eighteen year old in America.

[The war] rent the fabric of consciousness so drastically as to make repair almost impossible. And it made a gap in belief so large that through it people could begin to question the other myths of the Corporate State.⁶¹

As the State meets every breach of its regulations with force and repression, more and more individuals "opt-out" of the entire system. Although this phenomenon has been most widespread in the youth sector of the population, Reich maintains that it is spreading throughout all segments of society.

"Recent strikes", writes Reich, "have repeatedly shown

the depth of worker disaffection, and the fact that it goes far beyond a mere question of wages".⁶² The low status worker, on Reich's view, suffers from an inferiority complex, has no hope of improving his position in the hierarchy, perceives government as being run by and for the economic elite. Furthermore, inflation and taxes are seen to disproportionately effect him, and he, more than any other socio-economic group, experiences the tedium and meaninglessness of assembly line work.

The case for disaffection by professionals and white-collar workers can also be made, although Reich notes that their situation differs significantly from that of the blue-collar worker. Unlike the blue-collar worker, the professional worker suffers from anxiety and insecurity as well as from boredom and meaninglessness. From Reich's point of view, even areas which were once associated with a modicum of autonomy, such as medicine or law, have succumbed to organization and constraints: "The dentist feels like a plumber or mechanic;... the young lawyer feels like he has become a brief-writing machine...."⁶³ The professional worker is an anonymous organization knows that he can, and probably will, be replaced at the drop of a hat. "And on top of these job dissatisfactions may come the acute misery of finding that his children are alienated from him, and perhaps his wife also, so that the joys of home life dissolve in bitterness and his work has become an end in itself".⁶⁴

In spite of differences in material terms, there is

enough which all workers have in common to provide some of the necessary conditions for conversation to Consciousness III.

If we take white- and blue-collar people together, we can see how many of their dissatisfactions parallel those of the new generation. The majority of adults in this country hate their work. Whether it is a factory job, a white-collar job, or the role of being a housewife, they hate their work as much as young people rebel against the prospect of similar work; indeed, it is the parents' feelings that are a principle source of the children's feelings.⁶⁵

The latent hostility and resentment created by this dissatisfaction has heretofore been vented against scapegoats such as communists, atheists, hippies, the underprivileged, socialists, and the like. "In a more general sense, they blame a decline in morals and religion, lack of hard work, and other faults of character [for the miseries that they endure]".⁶⁶

The only reason that Consciousness II individuals have not revolted is that they lack an affirmative, optimistic vision of an alternative way of life. Consciousness II is convinced that "human nature" is such that all prospects of a better way of life are unrealistic and utopian. "Behind a facade of optimism, Consciousness II has a profoundly pessimistic view of man. It sees man in Hobbesian terms; human beings are by nature aggressive, competitive, power-seeking; uncivilized man is a jungle beast".⁶⁷ Given this pessimistic outlook, the risks of change inevitably seem to outweigh any marginal and uncertain benefits.

"If we are correct that the middle-class consciousness

remains unbreached by all the negative aspects of the Corporate State because of the lack of a model of changed goals, how can this missing factor possibly be supplied"?⁶⁸ The answer that Reich gives to this question is that older people have not yet been exposed to the more general values underlying Consciousness III. They observe the particular manifestations of the underlying principles, such as certain forms of dress, certain styles of music, etc., and conclude that since they do not appreciate these things, they are excluded from the entire experience of the new consciousness. This, according to Reich, is a misconception:

Consciousness III can appreciate Vivaldi as well as the blues. It is the underlying principle that counts: a non-material set of values. For older people, a new consciousness could rest on growing a garden, reading literature, baking bread, playing Bach on a recorder, or developing a new sense of family, so long as it represents a true knowledge of self, rather than false consciousness.⁶⁹

"Liberation", on Reich's view, consists of a re-ordering of priorities so that material values yield their current primary position and are succeeded by aesthetic values. A specific example of such a "liberation" is provided by Reich in the following passage:

A man who is "trapped" in a \$25,000-a-year job gets free by realizing that the material things he thinks he must provide his family may well be replaced by non-material things, such as being a better father and husband.⁷⁰

A critical aspect of Reich's framework is his belief that, because the Corporate State is a "seamless web",⁷¹ any breach in the belief-system associated with it must result

in the arrival at a particular ideological point of view. One need only concentrate upon clarification of any problem which an individual might have, such as pollution, traffic jams, boredom on the job, inflation, etc., and that individual will inevitably be led to identical insights regarding the sources (and evils) of racism and imperialism.⁷²

The task of the new generation is emphatically not one of radicalizing society in order to mobilize revolutionary change. Instead, the Consciousness III individual sets an example to others by living his own life-style. "The most important means of conversion is, and will continue to be, simply living one's own life according to one's own needs".⁷³ By showing others the road to the recovery of self, the new generation assures the continuance of the revolution:

When self is recovered, the power of the Corporate State will be ended, as miraculously as a kiss breaks a witch's evil enchantment.⁷⁴

Consciousness III is to provide the model of changed goals which will begin the exodus from Consciousness II by the workers and middle-classes. It is the promise of increasing defections from the ranks of Consciousness II which assures the downfall of the Corporate State. The Corporate State depends upon the maintenance of a willing producer and an insatiable consumer; this in turn, is provided for by the myths of Consciousness II.

Now all we have to do is close our eyes and imagine that everyone has become a Consciousness III: the Corporate State vanishes.⁷⁵

And yet, it might be argued, is it not possible that there are those who fully understand the system under which they live and who are aware of the evils of Consciousness II, but whose place in the Corporate State secures them all the opportunities for the realization of Consciousness III values without any of the deprivations inherent in "dropping-out"? For instance, what about the idle rich? Furthermore, is it not possible that there are some individuals in the hierarchy whose conception of "self-expression" and the "good-life" consists of manipulating others, wielding power, and maximising control? Worse yet, perhaps a great many people know that they are being exploited, and like it. Will the cheerful exploiters yield power peacefully? Will those who happily lead what Reich terms a "meaningless" life passively accept the turmoil and uncertainty accompanying the breakdown of the social order?

Although Reich does not deal systematically with the problems outlined above, we can gain some insights about his possible reaction to these questions from the speculative passages which make up the two concluding chapters of The Greening of America.

With regard to the possible existence of a "power-elite" benefiting from the status quo, Reich has this to say:

There is a great discovery awaiting those who choose a new set of values.... The discovery is simply this: there is nobody whatever [sic.] on the other side. Nobody wants inadequate housing and medical care -- only the machine. Nobody wants war except the machine. And even businessmen, once liberated, would roll in the grass and lie in the sun. There is no need, then,

to fight any group of people in America. They are all fellow sufferers. There is no reason to fight the machine. It can be made the servant of man. Consciousness III can make a new society.⁷⁶

It is probably true that nobody wants inadequate housing and medical care for themselves, or for those they care about. The question is, however, are certain individuals and groups willing to tolerate these conditions for others? Furthermore, do certain individuals and groups actively oppose efforts to provide for these needs and others on a more equitable basis? Reich neither asks nor answers these questions.

Although Reich explicitly denies the possibility of turmoil and violence surrounding the transition from a Consciousness II to a Consciousness III society in several passages, the possibility of violence seems to be acknowledged by the following:

Perhaps there are bad times ahead. Change will follow an up-and-down course. There may be periods of apathy, cynicism and despair, episodes of violent repression, times when hope is difficult to maintain. Perhaps it will be necessary to seek shelter, to avoid unnecessary exposure, to struggle [italics mine], to form small communes and communities away from the worst pressures, or to take jobs within the establishment and try to preserve one's freedom nevertheless. But the whole Corporate State rests upon nothing but consciousness. When consciousness changes, its soldiers will refuse to fight, its police will rebel, its bureaucrats will stop their work, its jailers will open the bars. Nothing can stop the power of consciousness.⁷⁷

Reich advances the following passage as a further example of his fears of violence and disorder during the transitional period.

Certainly we must expect ugly and violent times ahead, with incidents such as People's Park in Berkeley, the

Harvard bust, or the Chicago police riot steadily increasing in numbers and intensity; with more and more schools becoming armed camps like San Francisco State, with more repressive legislation, with helicopter or shotgun attacks upon our own population. An increase in all of these forms of conflict and violence will surely come, involving more and more of the population, causing disruption of life, restriction of freedom, injuries and deaths. Our point is that it will not succeed. The power of consciousness, that great discovery of the new generation, will not be stopped as readily as the demand for votes or bread.⁷⁸

The only possibilities omitted here, and perhaps it is a mere oversight, are napalm attacks on communes and the placement of Consciousness III individuals in concentration camps.

Some of Reich's views on the possibility of struggle and political organization are evidenced by the following discussion of resistance and political activism.

In discussing the sit-ins and demonstrations connected with the Civil Rights Movement and the war in Vietnam and their effect upon the development of Consciousness III, Reich anticipates the objection that these forms of protest are tactics which can be categorized under economic pressure, coercion, violence, non-violence, "speech-plus-action", and civil disobedience.

The old categories have little meaning. What the students have done is to convert all of these forms into something else: tactics at the level of consciousness. They express consciousness, they demonstrate consciousness to others, they seek to raise consciousness in others, they preserve consciousness in the demonstrators. They are a physical embodiment, an intangible made into flesh and blood, a state of mind made real and visible. What the students did was to confront the society with their whole values.⁷⁹

Thus, it would seem that Consciousness III can include a great deal of concerted action directed toward the disruption of

the activities of others: defined of course as "tactics at the level of consciousness".

An important factor which Reich expects will reduce the chances of turmoil is the abundance of material goods provided by technology.

The crucial point is that technology has made possible that "change in human nature" which has been sought so long but could not come into existence while scarcity stood in the way. It is just this simple: when there is enough food and shelter for all, man no longer needs to base his society on the assumption that all men are antagonistic to one another.⁸⁰

One might note in passing that turmoil resulting from scarcity can only be avoided given the existence of agreement on the principles of distribution: a condition which is satisfied, presumably, after the revolution.

Similarly, the underlying basis of Consciousness III is total agreement on major values;⁸¹ however, it would seem that until everyone in a given society is converted (which is an incremental process) there is the very real possibility of dissent, conflict, and violence based upon divergent value-commitments.

Although an attempt has been made to avoid criticism in this chapter, statements must first be presented in order to be criticized, and if they are inconsistent or contradictory it could be argued that their juxtaposition entails an implicit criticism. For the most part, however, this chapter consists of an exposition of the essential substance and content of The Greening of America as a background for further discussion and criticism.

Footnotes - Chapter I

¹ Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970).

² John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: Signet Books, The New American Library, Inc., 1967).

³ David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). It is interesting to note that Riesman's three classifications, tradition-directed, inner-directed, and other-directed, are superficially similar to Reich's three levels of "consciousness".

⁴ Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. by John Wilkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964).

⁵ William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1920).

⁶ Sloan Wilson, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1920).

⁷ Reich's preoccupation with sensuality, living in harmony with the elements, and the virtues of nature are somewhat reminiscent of writers such as Thoreau, Wordsworth, and Blake. One must note, however, that Reich is equally at home with milkshakes, all-night restaurants, and music amplified to the threshold of pain, while it seems highly unlikely that the Romantics would have shared these enthusiasms.

⁸ Reich, op. cit. Properly speaking, "the American crisis" involves several specific problems outlined on pages four through eight as well as all of the ramifications dealt with in chapters three through seven.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 4-8. Briefly summarized, the seven problems are as follows:

(1) "Disorder, corruption, hypocrisy, war". Reich notes the anxiety and terror which mark the disintegration of the social fabric.

(2) "Poverty, distorted priorities, and law-making by private power".

(3) "Uncontrolled technology and the destruction of environment".

(4) "Decline of democracy and liberty; powerlessness". Reich notes the rise of a managerial hierarchy, the rise of administrative agencies, with wide-ranging powers, and the growth of corporations able to ignore both stock-holders and consumers; all which impinge upon the individual's liberties and diminish his power.

(5) "The artificiality of work and culture". Meaningless work, useless and harmful products, and vicarious pleasures characterize American society, on Reich's view.

(6) "Absence of community". Loneliness and alienation resulted from the protocol, competition, and hostility which are associated with all aspects of American life; from the family to the anonymous organizations in which people spend their working days.

(7) "Loss of self". The individual is stripped of his imagination, creativity, and individuality in order to prepare him for a place in the technological society. "Instinct, feeling, and spontaneity are repressed by overwhelming forces".

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 13. Americans cannot act to eliminate the seven problems outlined as the "American crisis" because this crisis is itself founded upon a "deeper" crisis in understanding: "Thus a true [sic.] definition of the American crisis would say this: we no longer understand the system under which we live, hence the structure has become obsolete and we have become powerless; in turn, the system has been permitted to assume unchallenged power to dominate our lives, and now rumbles along unguided and therefore indifferent to human ends". "What is this 'understanding' that holds such a key place in our contemporary situation? Clearly the word 'understanding' is inadequate, for we are talking about something much broader and deeper than 'understanding' usually connotes. To describe what we are talking about, we propose to use the term 'consciousness'".

¹¹ Ibid. "It [consciousness] is a term that already has several meanings, including an important one in Marx, a medical one, a psychoanalytic one, a literary or artistic one, and one given us by users of hallucinogenic drugs. Our use of the term 'consciousness' will not be exactly like any of these, but it gains meaning from all of them, and is consistent with all of them".

¹² Ibid., p. 16.

¹³ Ibid., p. 15. "As a mass phenomenon, consciousness is formed by the underlying economic and social conditions. There was a consciousness that went with peasant life in the Middle Ages, and a consciousness that went with small town, preindustrial life in America". Reich hedges this conception of the source of consciousness with the following: "Culture and government interact with consciousness; they are its products but they also help to form it. While consciousness is the creator of any social system, it can lag behind a system, once created, and even be manipulated by that system. Lag and manipulation are the factors that produce a consciousness characterized by unreality".

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 39.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 22.

²¹ Ibid., p. 49.

²² Ibid. I have taken the liberty of substituting the words "corporate hierarchy" for Reich's use of "Corporate State" in the original text. A brief clarification of Reich's unique use of the term "corporate state" follows on page 10 of this chapter. Until then, it was felt that "corporate hierarchy" would not alter the meaning of the sentence too drastically, while its use would avoid certain ambiguities stemming from the differences between Reich's meaning of "corporate state" and more traditional meanings of that term.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 52.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 61.

26 Ibid., p. 63.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., p. 64.

29 Ibid., pp. 69-70.

30 Ibid., p. 70.

31 Ibid., pp. 73-74.

32 Ibid., chap. iii, passim.

33 Ibid., p. 143.

34 Ibid., p. 154.

35 For a discussion of the origins of the Corporate State see C.F. Strong, A History of Modern Political Constitutions (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), chap. xv, Pt. III.

36 Reich, op. cit., p. 93.

37 Ibid., p. 96.

38 Ibid., p. 103.

39 Ibid., p. 105.

40 Ibid., p. 104.

41 Ibid., p. 113.

42 Ibid., pp. 103-104.

43 Ibid., p. 104.

44 Ibid., p. 241.

45 Ibid., p. 240.

46 Ibid., p. 241.

47 Ibid., p. 243.

48 Ibid., p. 244.

49 Ibid., p. 245.

50 Ibid., p. 248.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., p. 278.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., pp. 204-205.

55 Ibid., p. 325.

56 Ibid., p. 327.

57 Earlier, Reich seemed to place a greater emphasis upon factors such as the means of production and distribution as the primary shapers of consciousness, with, of course, the aforementioned hedge concerning manipulation and lag. See footnote 13 above.

58 Ibid., p. 328.

59 Ibid., p. 330.

60 Ibid., p. 328.

61 Ibid., p. 232.

62 Ibid., p. 294.

63 Ibid., p. 295.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., p. 296.

66 Ibid., p. 297.

67 Ibid., p. 70.

68 Ibid., p. 300.

69 Ibid., p. 301.

70 Ibid., pp. 302-303. A further instance of Reich's belief in the revolutionary potential of non-material values can be cited on page 313: "The great mistake of radicals has been to try to interest workers in a revolt based primarily on material injustice. The real deprivation has not been in terms of material goods but in terms of a deadened mind, a loss of feeling, a life that excludes all new experience. This is the true nature of contemporary servitude. For the workers and the middle class, a Consciousness III revolution would express the need of all persons, old as well as young, no matter how employed, to keep on growing and learning throughout life, and therefore the need of the vast majority of the populace to overthrow the slavery of domination and of empty lives".

71 On this point one may quote the following, allowing Reich to speak for himself: "...the point is that the Corporate State is a seamless web, that all issues lead to the same insights concerning what is wrong: that all issues are related; and that the place to start is where the problems are visible and tangible". Ibid., p. 303.

72 Ibid., pp. 303-305, passim.

73 Ibid., p. 319.

74 Ibid., p. 318.

75 Ibid., p. 329.

76 Ibid., p. 378.

77 Ibid., pp. 376-377.

78 Ibid., p. 341.

79 Ibid., p. 360.

80 Ibid., p. 415.

81 Ibid., p. 418. "The basis of a Consciousness III community must be agreement on major values". Note that Reich's Consciousness III society does not meet his requirements for a truly, "political" community, the basis of which is cultural diversity. (See p. 12 above).

CHAPTER II

THE MAKING OF A COUNTER CULTURE

The Making of a Counter Culture¹ embodies Theodore Roszak's comprehensive analysis of a movement which he terms the "counter culture". In this work, Roszak sets forth what he feels to be the essential attributes of the counter culture and attempts to support his claim that this movement offers the only present hope, if not the last hope for a transformation of "...this disoriented civilization of ours into something a human being can identify as home".²

Roszak's "counter culture" is the counterpart of Reich's "Consciousness III": a group which at this time includes a minority of young people, as well as a few adult mentors, who are interested or involved in such things as the psychology of alienation, oriental mysticism, psychedelic drugs, and communitarian experiments. This group makes up "...a cultural constellation that radically diverges from values and assumptions that have been in the mainstream of our society at least since the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century".³

Although Roszak acknowledges that his vision of hippies, bohemians, and alienated youth founding a new social order might seem incredible, he maintains that they are "...all we have to hold against the final consolidation of a technocratic totalitarianism in which we find ourselves ingeniously

adapted to an existence wholly estranged from everything that has ever made the life of man an interesting adventure".⁴

If the resistance of the counter culture fails, I think there will be nothing in store for us but what anti-utopians like Huxley and Orwell have forecast -- though I have no doubt that these dismal despotisms will be far more stable and effective than their prophets have foreseen. For they will be equipped with techniques of inner-manipulation as unobtrusively fine as gossamer.⁵

Roszak admits that this outlook might seem extreme, especially in light of the technocracy's apparent ability to soothe the tensions stemming from disorganization, privation, and injustice. But this capability itself is, for Roszak, one of the technocracy's more sinister aspects:

The technocracy is not simply a power structure wielding vast material influence; it is the expression of a grand cultural imperative, a veritable mystique that is deeply endorsed by the populace. It is therefore a capacious sponge able to soak up prodigious quantities of discontent and agitation, often well before they look like anything but amusing eccentricities or uncalled for aberrations.⁶

Just as Reich's endorsement of Consciousness III centered around a rejection of technology, the "corporate state", and "Consciousness II", Roszak's enthusiasm for the counter culture becomes comprehensible in light of his rejection of science, the "technocracy", and "objective consciousness".⁷

Roszak's "technocracy" is very similar to Charles Reich's "corporate state":

By the technocracy, I mean that social form which an industrial society reaches the peak of its organizational integration.... Drawing upon such unquestionable imperatives as the demand for efficiency, for social security, for large-scale co-ordination of men and resources, for ever higher levels of affluence and ever more impressive manifestations of collective human

power, the technocracy works to knit together the anachronistic gaps and fissures of the industrial society.⁸

The system of production and distribution is large and complex; it impinges upon every aspect of man's existence: in fact, it is so pervasive, and so central to the daily lives of individuals, that its existence is taken for granted.

There is no question of adapting the technocracy to the needs of individuals; instead, the human context becomes subject to manipulation according to the interests of the technocracy.

"Politics, education, leisure, entertainment, culture as a whole, the unconscious drives, and even, as we shall see, protest against the technocracy itself: all these become the subjects of purely technical scrutiny and of purely technical manipulation".⁹

Control on such a vast scale demands the talents of especially trained experts who "...assume authoritative influence over even the most seemingly personal aspects of life: sexual behavior, child-rearing, mental health, recreation, etc."¹⁰ Individuals defer judgment to the experts whose sole purpose is to keep the productive apparatus operating efficiently. These experts do not conceive of themselves as agents of a totalitarian system; far from it: "Rather, they easily see themselves as the conscientious managers of a munificent social system which is, by the very fact of its broadcast affluence, incompatible with any form of exploitation".¹¹

The technocracy is not amenable to the ordinary politi-

cal and economic classifications; "indeed, it is characteristic of the technocracy to render itself ideologically invisible".

While daily political argument continues within and between the capitalist and collectivist societies of the world, the technocracy increases and consolidates its power in both as a trans-political phenomenon following the dictates of industrial efficiency, rationality, and necessity.¹²

Political and economic debates never confront the technocracy because it "...is not generally perceived as a political phenomenon in our advanced industrial societies".¹³ The technocracy assumes the role of a cultural premise; a "given" which, like the very air we breathe, is beyond criticism because it is taken for granted. Although Roszak cites statements by John F. Kennedy¹⁴ and Robert S. McNamara¹⁵ as specific examples of the technocratic mentality, he makes it abundantly clear that he does not believe that the technocracy is the exclusive product of capitalism:

Rather, it is the product of a mature and accelerating industrialism. The profiteering could be eliminated; the technocracy would remain in force. The key problem we have to deal with is the paternalism of expertise within a socio-economic system which is so organized that it is inextricably beholden to expertise. And, moreover, to an expertise which has learned a thousand ways to manipulate our acquiescence with an imperceptible subtlety.¹⁶

The actual source of the technocracy's power lies with the almost universal acceptance of what Roszak terms the "scientific world view" and the accompanying "myth of objective consciousness".

"To the older collectivist ideologies, which were as given to the value of industrial expansion as the capitalist

class enemy, the connection between totalitarian control and science was not apparent".¹⁷ The experts dominate in the technocracy because the general populace has been convinced that "...they [the experts] know (reliably) about all things relevant to our survival and happiness: human needs, social engineering, economic planning, international relations, invention, education, etc."¹⁸ But just what is "reliable knowledge"?, asks Roszak. "The answer is: reliable knowledge is knowledge that is scientifically sound, since science is that to which modern man refers for the definitive explication of reality".¹⁹ In turn, that which characterizes scientifically sound knowledge is objectivity:

Scientific knowledge is not just feeling or speculation or subjective ruminating. It is a verifiable description of reality that exists independent of any purely personal considerations.²⁰

"And that at last is how we define an expert: he is one who really knows what is what, because he cultivates an objective consciousness".²¹

Roszak uses the term "myth" to loosely signify any arbitrary construct which holds together or makes meaningful the values of a society. Some societies conceive of their mythologies as literal statements about remote ages and places -- heaven, Asgard, Mount Olympus, etc. In the face of scientific skepticism, the belief-systems which are embodied in myth either crumble altogether, or are re-interpreted symbolically or metaphorically. But "...even here the secular temperament tends to sweep the field by asserting reductionist psychological or sociological correlatives

for the myth".²² The result is that science and "objective consciousness" assume the role which myth previously occupied in society: "...objectivity, whatever its epistemological status [?], has become the commanding life style of our society: the one most authoritative way of regarding the self, others, and the whole of our enveloping reality".²³

Objectivity as a state of being fills the very air we breathe in a scientific culture; it grips us subliminally in all we say, feel, and do. The mentality of the ideal scientist becomes the very soul of the society.²⁴

Although it may be impossible to be totally objective, our society shapes the individual personality to feel and act as if it were a detached observer impersonally surveying the persons and things which surround it. "In short, as science elaborates itself into the dominant cultural influence of our age, it is the psychology and not the epistemology of science that urgently requires our critical attention; for it is primarily at this level that the most consequential deficiencies and imbalances of the technocracy are revealed".²⁵

The prevalence of objective consciousness results in a culture marked by three deleterious characteristics. Roszak calls them: (1) the alienative dichotomy; (2) the invidious hierarchy; (3) the mechanistic imperative.

(1) The "alienative dichotomy" consists of a division of reality into two spheres; the "In-Here" and the "Out-There". "By In-Here is meant that place within the person to which consciousness withdraws when one wants to know without becoming involved in or committed to that which is being known".²⁶

The scientific method, according to Roszak, causes the observer to bifurcate his universe; estranging the self (In-Here) from Out-There (i.e., that which is not In-Here).

People strive to behave "scientifically", and this entails the creation of an In-Here which "...undertakes to know without an investment of the person in the act of knowing".²⁷

The In-Here is purged of any emotions or irrational feelings: "...the progressive alienation of more and more of In-Here's personal contents in the effort to achieve the densest possible unit... an identity contracted into a small, hard ball; hence a dense, diminished identity, something which is less than one otherwise might be".²⁸

(2) While the In-Here is the source [sic.] of reliable knowledge, and is therefore a secure and desirable place, the Out-There is a place of drift, unpredictability, and stupidity: it is "...untrustworthy, perhaps [even] downright dangerous"²⁹ The In-Here prefers to study the Out-There "...as if it were completely stupid, meaning without intention or wisdom or purposeful pattern".³⁰ The In-Here detaches itself from that which it perceives and claims to be aware only of its overt behavioural manifestations; Roszak asserts that this necessarily reduces that which is observed to a lower status.

...like the racist who cannot under Jim Crow conditions come to see the segregated black man as anything but a doltish and primitive nigger, so In-Here, as the unmoved spectator, cannot feel that Out-There has any ingenuity or dignity. Under this kind of scrutiny, even the other human beings who inhabit Out-There can be made stupid, for they were not made to function within laboratory conditions or according to the exacting needs of questionnaires and surveys.³¹

The social scientist and psychologist, on this view, necessarily denigrates and demeans those whom he studies by the very means he uses. He reduces his subjects to the status of mere things in the attempt to be systematic and objective. Roszak understands the scientist to be saying

I can perceive no more than your behavioral facade....
 I shall observe this behavior of yours and record it....
 Do not turn to me or appeal to me to ask me to become
 involved with you.... I assume that I can adequately
 understand what you are doing or intending without
 entering wholly into your life. I am not particularly
 interested in what you uniquely are; I am interested
 only in the general pattern to which you conform. I
 assume I have the right to use you to perform this pro-
 cess of classification. I assume I have the right to
 reduce all that you are to an integer in my science.³²

"At the extreme, this alienated relationship is that of the Nazi physician experimenting upon his human victims, learning interesting new things about pain, suffering, privation".^{33*}

The scientists, and those imbued with the methods of "objective consciousness", introduce the "invidious hierarchy" by the means outlined above and by their belief that "orderliness" derives from the activity of the In-Here upon the Out-There. The scientific mind, according to Roszak, only

* In anticipation of possible objections, Roszak devotes a lengthy appendix of The Making of a Counter Culture to illustrations drawn from what he terms "mainstream science and technology" which he feels will support the comparison between Nazi death-camp experiments and the activities of contemporary social and natural scientists ("My object is to present items that have a routine, if not an almost casual, character and can therefore stand as the voice of normal, day-to-day science and technology as they are practiced in our society...." p. 269). The material included in the appendix supplements the material in the three categories under discussion here and will be covered more extensively below.

perceives nature as "beautiful" after it has been tidied up and pigeonholed. It is through the constant intervention of the In-Here that the chaos of Out-There is brought under control: "...the natural environment must be conquered and subjected to forceful improvement... the social environment -- the body politic -- must be brought ...completely under centralized, deliberative control...."³⁴

(3) The "mechanistic imperative" is the result of those few irrational vestiges of the In-Here which survive the psychic contraction outlined in (1) above. Somehow, the In-Here retains a need for sensuous contact, fantasy, spontaneity, love, hate, the need to moralize and feel concern for others:

Therefore, In-Here, in search of impregnable objectivity, takes the final step. It sets about inventing a superior command and control center that will take over whenever In-Here's capacity to achieve perfect impersonality breaks down: an electronic nervous system!³⁵

Man's infatuation with the machine has often been mistakenly associated with his quest for power. But it is the machine's predictability and its capacity to be routinized that is its great appeal, according to Roszak. "Why should we not invent machines that objectify thought, creativity, decision making, moral judgment..."³⁶

Ordinarily, the tasks outlined above would be thought of as inappropriate as well as unamenable to the manipulations of computers, but, if this turns out to be the case, then the problems are redefined to fit the capabilities of machines:

If we discover that computers cannot solve the basic problems of city planning... then we redefine the mean-

ing of "city",... and assume that all the problems of this entity are quantitative. In this way man is replaced in all areas by the machine, not because the machine can do things "better", but rather because all things have been reduced to what the machine is capable of doing.³⁷

It is at this point that the super-efficient, all-powerful bureaucrats, technicians, managers, and systems analysts become indistinguishable from the cybernated systems that they assist.

Roszak supplements the account of science and objective consciousness found in the main body of The Making of a Counter Culture with an appendix entitled "Objectivity Unlimited". The examples in this appendix are not drawn from scandalous sources, such as the aforementioned Nazi experiments, but from "...what I believe can fairly be called mainstream science (I include the behavioral sciences in the term) and technology".³⁸ It should also be noted that Roszak's indictment of science includes a blanket category of "complicity" encompassing what appears to be every conceivable area of research; whether or not the researcher could envision the misuse of his findings or not. It appears that only "acquiescent routineers" will be capable of "playing dumb" by grinding out research in the technocracy: "One would think that a man who had been hired by pyromaniacs to perfect better matches would begin to sense, at some point, how much a culprit he was. But fame and cash can do wonders to bolster one's sense of innocence".³⁹

Given the technocratic "gravy train" of research grants

and unlimited laboratory facilities, the legions of young scientists-on-the-make take up "...every conceivable form of research and development, the better to confound and stupefy the populace".⁴⁰ The technocracy endorses and subsidizes all forms of pure research because it has no well-defined values with which to discriminate between necessary and unnecessary, desirable and undesirable pursuits:

If only one can find a way to graft the head of a baboon on to a blue jay (after all, why not?)... if only one can synthesize a virus lethal enough to wipe out a whole nation (after all, why not?)... if only one can invent a Greek tragedy writing machine (after all, why not?) ...[several items are here omitted for the sake of brevity]... if only one can invent a method of shooting passengers like bullets from Chicago to Istanbul (after all, why not?)... if only one can develop a computer that will simulate the mind of God (after all, why not?) ...one's name is made!⁴¹

Any quest for knowledge, regardless of its implications or probable consequences, is as legitimate as any other; especially if it pays off in quick, stunning success, or in the advancement of one's career.

Once an area of life has been earmarked for study, there is no way to dispute the scientist's right to interrogate and manipulate; the reason being that there is no "rational" way to deny the scientist access to an area of inquiry "...without calling into question the entire scientific enterprise".⁴²

To put it another way, "...there exists no way whatever, on strictly scientific grounds [my emphasis], to invalidate any objective quest for knowledge, regardless of where it may lead or how it may proceed".⁴³ In order to deny the scientist's alleged "right to know", on Roszak's view, one would have to

invoke some notion of "sacred" or "sacrosanct"; but since the history of the rise of objective consciousness is the history of the destruction of fuzzy notions such as "sacred" and "sacrosanct", these concepts survive only as "...withered roses we come upon, crushed in the diaries of a prescientific age".⁴⁴

Roszak seems to believe that the absence of a sense of the sacred (which is due, of course, to the rise of science and the myth of objective consciousness) precludes the making of any ethical commitments. "The expansion of objective consciousness must, of necessity, be undertaken at the expense of moral sensibility".⁴⁵

It is only when we recognize the essentially no-holds-barred character of the objective consciousness... that the demand for a balanced appreciation of its achievements becomes irrelevant, as well as sleazy in the extreme. The defense of science and technology by reference to balance is, in fact, the worst vice of our culture, betraying an ethical superficiality that is truly appalling.⁴⁶

Roszak believes that as things stand now, the scientists and technicians are allowed to do anything to which curiosity or research contracts draw them, and individual citizens are only allowed to voice their criticisms after the fact.

"The balance that emerges from such a situation might just as well be gained if our society were to agree to subsidize every whim that arose within a community of certified lunatics, on the assumption that a certain amount of what such a procedure eventually produced would meet any standard of worthwhileness one cared to name".⁴⁷ What Roszak wants, and what balance fails to provide, is "...an ethical discipline

[which] the technocracy imposes upon itself by reference to a pre-established moral end,... "48

In order to catch a glimpse of what the future will look like in the grip of the technocracy, "...we need only examine the activities and sentiments of those whose capacity for experience has already been raped by the ethos of objectivity".⁴⁹ The illustrations of this "mind rape" are from what Roszak terms the normal day-to-day science and technology as it is practiced in our society. For the sake of brevity, three items have been chosen from among numerous examples provided by Roszak representing the alienative dichotomy, the invidious hierarchy, and the mechanistic imperative.

The first item can be understood to be representative of both the alienative dichotomy and the invidious hierarchy in that (1) the observer appears to be emotionally estranged from that which is under observation; and, (2) insofar as one can ascertain from the account presented, the observer treats Mary Rafferty, the subject, as a thing, not a person. Roszak notes that the experiment dates back nearly a century. However, its relevance to contemporary science stems from the fact that "...it is cited without criticism in a recent survey of psychology as a significant example of pioneering neurological research".⁵⁰

"The experiments involved passing an electric current into the young woman's brain through a portion of the skull that had eroded away".⁵¹ The following is quoted by Roszak from an account of the experiment in an article by David

Krech:⁵²

Observation 3. Passed an insulated needle into the left posterior lobe.... Mary complained of a very strong and unpleasant feeling of tingling in both right extremities. In order to develop more decided reactions, the strength of the current was increased ...her countenance exhibited great distress, and she began to cry... left hand was extended... the arms agitated with clonic spasms, her eyes became fixed, with pupils widely dilated, lips were blue and she frothed at the mouth.⁵³

Three days after the experiment, Mary Rafferty died.

Roszak cites the following quotation from P.B. Medawar as being significant to the methodological validity of the above type of research:

For all its crudities, Behaviorism, conceived as a methodology rather than as a psychological system, taught psychology with brutal emphasis that "the dog is whining" and "the dog is sad" are statements of altogether different empirical standing, and heaven help psychology if it ever again overlooks the distinction.⁵⁴

To this Roszak adds: "Professor Medawar does not make clear, however, on whom the 'brutal emphasis' of this distinction has fallen: the experimenter or the experimental subject. Does it, for example, make any difference to the methodology if the subject is capable of saying, 'I am sad', 'I am hurt'?"⁵⁵

A second example, and one that is particularly macabre, illustrates the alienative dichotomy, the invidious hierarchy, and an aspect of the mechanistic imperative (i.e., what can be done must be done).

Dr. Vladimir Demikhov, an eminent Soviet experimental surgeon whose grafting of additional or different heads and limbs on to dogs has drawn considerable attention, has come up with a new suggestion for the advancement of transplantation surgery.

According to "Soviet Weekly", Dr. Demikhov believes that it would be simple to store organs for spare-part surgery -- not by developing techniques for banks or particular organs or tissues but by temporarily grafting the stored organ on to the exterior of human "vegetables".

A human "vegetable" is a human being who, through accident or disease, has lost all intelligent life, but is otherwise functioning normally. The surgeon's "bank" would consist of technically living bodies, each supporting externally a number of additional organs. (Anthony Tucker, science correspondent, The Guardian [London], January 20, 1968).⁵⁶

The example below is illustrative of what Roszak terms the mechanistic imperative: "The classic justification for technological progress has been that it steadily frees men from the burdens of existence and provides them with the leisure in which to make 'truly human uses' of their lives".⁵⁷ But, Roszak notes, long before we arrive at the point where we can appreciate creative leisure, creativity will have become the exclusive domain of the machine.

Can a computer be used to compose a symphony? As one who has been engaged in programming a large digital computer to program original musical compositions, I can testify that the very idea excites incredulity and indignation in many quarters. Such response in part reflects the extreme view of the nineteenth-century romantic tradition that regards music as direct communication of emotion from composer to listener -- "from heart to heart", as Wagner said. In deference to this view it must be conceded that we do not yet understand the subjective aspect of musical communication well enough to study it in precise terms.... On the other hand, music does have its objective side. The information encoded there relates to such quantitative entities as pitch and time, and is therefore accessible to rational and ultimately mathematical analysis... it is possible, at least in theory, to construct tables of probabilities describing a musical style, such as Baroque, Classical or Romantic, and perhaps even the style of an individual composer. Given such tables, one could then reverse the process and compose music in a given style. (Lejaren A. Hiller, Jr., in Scientific American, December, 1959. *Italics added*).⁵⁸

To Roszak, the most ominous and pathetic aspect of such statements is the confident "yet" that appears in them: "For the man who thinks that creativity might yet become a technology is the man who stands no chance of ever understanding what creativity is".⁵⁹

As we briefly mentioned above, Roszak does not believe that the traditional left-wing ideologies diverge from the principles of efficiency and materialism which lie at the heart of the technocracy. The traditional leftist ideologies are, for Roszak, as locked into the leviathan industrial apparatus as the capitalists are: "...Marxism is the mirror image of bourgeois industrialism: an image reversed, and yet unmistakably identical".⁶⁰ Both sides put their trust in science and technology and believe that the source of human happiness lies in better organization and greater productivity, but one side purports to strive for more equitable distribution. "For both traditions, the technocratic imperative with its attendant conception of life stands unchallenged".⁶¹ In each case the imperatives of efficiency and organization necessitate the existence of experts -- the collective ideologies merely replace the branch managers and administrators with industrial commissars and bureaucrats.

Can a revolution against the technocracy be based upon science and technology, the very sources of the technocracy itself? Roszak claims that the young answer in the negative by their endorsement of manifestoes such as the following:

The revolution which is beginning will call in question not only capitalist society but industrial society. The consumer's society must perish of a violent death. The society of alienation must disappear from history. We are inventing a new and original world. Imagination is seizing power.⁶²

It is the young who have seen through the fallacious contention that the technocracy is inherently linked to capitalism. The young know that to topple the technocracy they must exercise what Marcuse has termed the "Great Refusal": they must disaffiliate themselves from the objective consciousness and veneration of science which makes the technocracy possible. In doing so, they are the only force extant which represents an alternative to the technocracy.

Roszak asks: "Why should it be the young who rise most noticeably in protest against the expansion of the technocracy"?⁶³ The answer to this question lies in the unique social environment in which the current generation was raised.

The members of the younger generation are the inheritors of the iconoclasm which was fostered by the nineteen-fifties. The bohemians of the nineteen-fifties embodied the spirit of iconoclasm, and were the intellectual and cultural precursors of the contemporary youth movement. The work of Alan Ginsberg, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Mort Sahl, and Lenny Bruce crystalized the best reaction to "...the generation whose premature senility Dwight Eisenhower so marvelously incarnated and the disease of whose soul shone so lugubriously through the public obscenities that men like John Foster Dulles and Herman Khan and Edward Teller were prepared to call 'policy'".⁶⁴ MAD magazine, while susceptible to periodic

fits of infantilism, often featured tragi-comic parodies of the times which were quite effective although blunt exposés of the hypocracies which lay beneath the rhetoric of traditional authority figures. Add to this the emerging social criticism of C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, Erich Fromm, and others, and the stage is set for a radical departure from the docility and complacency which characterized the youth of the early fifties.

The question still remains however, as to why these social critics found a ready audience in youth during the late fifties and early sixties.

Although the post-World War II young have been raised in the shadow of the possibility of nuclear holocaust, they have enjoyed a childhood of material prosperity. The young, writes Roszak, have been led to believe that "...being human has something to do with pleasure and freedom".⁶⁵ After enjoying the comforts, economic security, and leisure that an extended childhood affords, they refuse to do meaningless work in order to indulge in happiness, joy, freedom, etc., on weekends: i.e., the "happiness" which is a "...transient relief or exuberant diversion we can sandwich in between atrocities: 'the pause that refreshes' before the next calamity".⁶⁶ Discipline and self-denial for the sake of affluence seems irrational to those who have experienced affluence and know that happiness does not stem from the acquisition of consumer goods.

Consequently, great numbers of youth find no other

alternative than to "drop out".

So, by way of a dialectic Marx could never have imagined, technocratic America produces a potentially revolutionary element among its own youth. The bourgeoisie, instead of discovering the class enemy in its factories, finds it across the breakfast table in the person of its own pampered children.⁶⁷

Roszak compares this flight from the technocracy with the early Hellenistic Christian movement of the third-century, in that much of it seems to be a flight away from corruption rather than toward some specific alternative.

Out of this disaffiliation, however, has come a willingness to search for forms of community which might fulfill the need for love, family, subsistence, and companionship.

It will take a deal of improvisation, using whatever examples one can find at hand: the life-way of Indian tribes, utopian precedents, the seventeenth-century Diggers, the French communities of work, the Israeli kibbutzim, the Hutterites.... Maybe none of them will work. But where else is there to turn? And where else can one any longer look for the beginnings of an honest revolution except in such "pre-revolutionary structure-making" (as Buber calls it)?⁶⁸

The young, many of whom are too alienated to compromise, seek community among those they can love and respect "...where there can be enduring friendships, children, and, by mutual aid, three meals a day scraped together by honorable and enjoyable labor".⁶⁹

To those who would rely upon more traditional political means to effect change, these efforts may be seen at best as personal therapies for social misfits; and at worst, as narcissism, hedonism, and a callous disregard for the plight of the poor and the socially disadvantaged. "How often have we heard old-line radicals condemn the bohemian young for the

'irresponsibility' of their withdrawal into kooky communities of their own"?⁷⁰ The young are told to "grow up" and "be responsible"; meaning:

Give your energy to political action. Help organize the slums or the agricultural laborers; plan political coalitions; register voters in Mississippi; join the Peace Corps; find a project; agitate; sit-in; come to the demonstration; subscribe to Dissent, Commentary, New Politics....⁷¹

The problem with these "alternatives" is that they are not really alternatives: none can provide for a "way of life" or sustenance for an entire generation: a period with S.D.S., registering voters, or in the Peace Corps is at best a temporary interlude, not a vocation. More importantly, this sort of activity does not confront the technocracy at its underpinnings; science, technology, and the objective consciousness.

The counter culture offers the only alternative to the technocracy because only its members subscribe to values and a life-style which is inimical to the scientific world-view and to the technological imperative. Roszak laments that the job of building a new society should have to fall upon those so young and naive: but, we should not be too impatient, for the generational revolt which is now in progress may not bear fruit until those who are now twelve reach their late twenties.⁷² In the meantime, the "adolescentization" of dissent poses difficult problems for the older radical, like Roszak, who is interested in seeing the counter cultural revolution succeed.

The remaining portions of The Making of a Counter Cul-

ture are devoted to two tasks: (1) to correctly identify the characteristics of the counter culture; and (2) to offer the guidance of a mature judgment to the young: to give form and direction to their enterprise so that they might avoid drift, confusion, and despair.

The young, miserably educated as they are, bring with them almost nothing but healthy instincts. The project of building a sophisticated framework of thought atop those instincts is rather like trying to graft an oak tree upon a wildflower. How to sustain the oak tree? More important, how to avoid crushing the wildflower?⁷³

As difficult as this project might seem, it is the task which Roszak feels must be done: "For the young have become one of the very few social levers dissent has to work with.... If we reject it in frustration for the youthful follies that also sprout there, where then do we turn"?⁷⁴

Roszak believes that the transition from one generation to the next offers the possibility of a radical cultural disjuncture followed by the victory of a new conception of life; a conception of life that Roszak feels might be more compatible with man's fundamental human needs. The young might merely alter the prevailing culture on a trivial or superficial level, but Roszak feels that this danger is minimized in that the present generational transition is unique for "...the scale on which it is taking place and the depth of antagonism it reveals".⁷⁵ Reflecting upon the extent of youth's deviation from the mainstream values and norms of his society, Roszak recalls the image of an invasion by centaurs of certain Olympian festivities presided over by Apollo.

Drunken and incensed, the centaurs burst in upon the civilized festivities that are in progress. But a stern Apollo, the guardian of the orthodox culture, steps forward to admonish the gate-crashers and drive them back. The image is a potent one, for it recalls what must always be a fearful experience in the life of any civilization: the experience of radical cultural disjuncture, the clash of irreconcilable conceptions of life. And the encounter is not always won by Apollo.⁷⁶

Another example of cultural disjuncture is provided by the early Christian movement within the Roman Empire. The contempt that the Christians felt for the Greco-Roman orthodoxy is similar to the counter culture's feeling for the technocracy. It is also similar in that it was the contempt "...of absolute nobodies, the very scum of the earth, whose own counter culture was, at this early stage, little more than a scattering of suggestive ideas, a few crude symbols, and a desperate longing".⁷⁷ The comparison, Roszak concedes, may seem exorbitant, but, "...all revolutionary changes seem unthinkable until they happen... and then they are understood to be inevitable".⁷⁸

The primary attribute of the counter culture is its renunciation of the technocratic conceptions of personal identity, authority, and morality. But the counter culture itself does not offer a cohesive identity in its opposition. Its membership is constantly in flux, and at times the only thing which unites that nebulous mass is a common symbol or song "...that seems to proclaim little more than 'we are special... we are different... we are outward-bound from the old corruptions of the world'".⁷⁹

But one thing which does unite the diverse elements of the counter culture, according to Roszak, is their common commitment to the non-intellective levels of the personality.

What makes the youthful disaffiliation of our time a cultural phenomenon, rather than merely a political movement, is the fact that it strikes beyond ideology to the level of consciousness, seeking to transform our deepest sense of the self, the other, the environment.⁸⁰

The counter culture endorses R.D. Laing's goal of "true sanity" as part of their quest; true sanity being

...in one way or another, the dissolution of the normal ego, that false self competently adjusted to our alienated social reality: the emergence of the "inner" archetypal mediators of divine power, and through this death a rebirth, and the eventual re-establishment of a new kind of ego-functioning, the ego now being the servant of the divine, no longer its betrayer.⁸¹

The counter culture rejects the scientific world-view which supports the alienative dichotomy, etc., and opts for a non-intellective world-view.

In order to describe the non-intellective aspects of the personality to which the counter culture is deeply committed, it is necessary to speak in terms borrowed from psychoanalysis, the mystics, and the Romantics. The Hindus and Buddhists too have traditions which contain vocabularies able to deal with the non-intellective consciousness.

If contemporary novels and films can serve as reliable indicators of a social climate, then the message that they unanimously convey is "...that the disease from which our age is dying is that of alienation,..."⁸² In the meantime, the sciences relentlessly pursue their quest for objectivity:

they "...raise alienation to its apotheosis as our only means of achieving a valid relationship to reality".⁸³ The question is, however, is there any other way in which we can know the world? To this question Roszak replies

Too often we... find ourselves struggling to discover some alternative method to produce the same sort of knowledge we now derive from science... an accumulation of verifiable propositions.⁸⁴

Roszak maintains that the only way to break free of this self-defeating pattern is to subordinate the question "how shall we know"? to the more important question "how shall we live"?

"Knowledge", in the scientific sense, is irrelevant to the primary purpose of human existence which is to "...integrate the whole of our nature by way of yielding nobility of conduct, honest fellowship, and joy".⁸⁵ Knowledge in the counter cultural sense may be expressed through one's authentic life-style; a life-style which embraces experiences which, though yielding no verifiable propositions, "...awake in us a sense of the world's majesty".⁸⁶

When we challenge the finality of objective consciousness as a basis for culture, what is at issue is the size of a man's life. We must insist that a culture which negates or subordinates or degrades visionary experience commits the sin of diminishing our existence.... The fact and the dire cost of this diminishing is nothing that can be adequately proved by what I write here, for it is an experience which every man must find... as soon as he refuses to block, to screen out, to set aside, to discount the needs his own personality thrusts upon him in its fullness, often in its terrifying fullness.⁸⁷

The concern of supreme importance is that every individual should become "...a whole and integrated person in whom there is manifested a sense of having come to terms with a reality

that is awesomely vast".⁸⁸ Those who take up this challenge, who open their consciousnesses to the "Out-There", will not place a very high value on scientific or technological progress. They will come to see the myth of objective consciousness as a vapid, sterile myth which diminishes human existence.

It is impossible to open one's personality to the reality of the non-intellective powers through consultation with experts. The expansion of the personality is achieved through a naive openness to experience -- no one can predict where or when the transformation will take place; this varies from person to person -- but Roszak believes that the magic of transcendence awaits everyone, if they will only allow it to happen.

What befalls us then is an experience of the personality suddenly swelling beyond all that we had once thought to be "real", swelling to become a greater and nobler identity than we had previously believed possible.⁸⁹

All potential leaders should be scrutinized for this expansion of character: we would accept the beauty of a fully illuminated personality as a standard of truth. "It is a matter of saying, perhaps, that truth ought not to be seen as the property of a proposition, but of the person".⁹⁰ We should not evaluate social and political policies by the criteria of the objective consciousness, but instead, we should follow policies which expand our capacities to experience. "This, in turn, means that we must be prepared to trust that the expanded personality becomes more beautiful, more creative, more humane than the search for objective conscious-

ness can make it".⁹¹ Roszak does not believe this attitude to be eccentric: for "Is it not the attitude we feel spontaneously compelled to assume whenever we find ourselves in the presence of an authentically great soul"?⁹² Any quibbling about the truth or falsity of the utterances of men such as Tolstoy, Dante, or the prophets of Israel is absurd: "Their words are a conduct of a power that one longs to share".

When a man has seen and has spoken as such men did, the criticisms of the objective consciousness fade into insignificance.... Compared with the visionary powers that moved in these souls, what is the value of all the minor exactitudes of all the experts on earth?⁹³

We must come to believe individuals like Blake when upon seeing the sun set, they claim to see "an Innumerable company of the Heavenly host crying 'Holy, Holy is the Lord God Almighty'". The present practice allows the poet or visionary to speak this way under the respectable rubric of "metaphorical license". "In such fashion, we confidently discount and denature the visionary experience, and the technocratic order of life rolls on undeterred, obedient to the scientific reality principle".⁹⁴ But, we must be willing to admit that our eyes can see the world transformed; "made lustrous beyond measure"; and we must admit that in seeing it thus, we see it as it really is. Magic, that age-old foe of the scientific world view, can help us to transform the mundane workday world "...into something bigger, perhaps more frightening, certainly more adventurous than the lesser rationality of objective consciousness".⁹⁵

A model for the counter culture to emulate is the shaman. The shaman is a central figure in tribal life; he is capable of providing the setting for the visionary experience which welds the community together.

The shaman might properly lay claim to being the culture hero par excellence, for through him creative forces that approach the superhuman seem to have been called into play.⁹⁶

It is through the village shaman that the world and the forces of nature can take on invisible personalities. The shaman is on intimate terms with these personalities and it is through his mediation that the whole community can participate in the magical visionary experience.

In the spirit of the best counter cultural tradition, the shaman makes use of drugs, starvation, smoke inhalation, hypnotic drum and dance rhythms, etc., to bring on the visionary psychic state. It is toward these practices that the counter culture gravitates in its attempt to enter the grand symbiotic system of nature; and through these shamanistic practices the counter culture is capable of becoming better acquainted with nature than the scientist or technician will ever be.

Unlike the "good magic" of the shaman, the "bad magic" of the scientist is unavailable to the whole community. Science possesses theory, methodology, and epistemology to support its inventions; "But... most of us have no better understanding of these things than the bewildered savages of the jungle".⁹⁷

We believe that somewhere behind the pills and the economic graphs there are experts who understand whatever... there is to understand. We know they are experts, because, after all, they talk like experts and besides possess degrees, licenses, titles, and certificates. Are we any better off than the savage who believes his fever has been cured because an evil spirit has been driven out of his system?⁹⁸

Both the shaman and the technical expert are figures which manipulate mysterious forces but unlike the technician the shaman "...seeks always to make available to all the full power of the magician's experience".⁹⁹ The scientist and the expert can only use their magic to mystify the populace and to reap selfish advantages, status, and rewards; "for the reality which scientific knowledge examines cannot be translated into either art or ritual which the community can participate in experiencing... it cannot be democratized as a form of vital experience".¹⁰⁰

Although Roszak admits that a mere reversion to primitivism of a remote past is not sufficient to revolutionize the present, shamanism is a unique model upon which the counter culture can draw for the construction of a "pansacrementalism" which might fulfill the spiritual, aesthetic, and sensual needs of men. The shamanistic tradition is quite compatible with the counter culture's implicit endorsement of the anarchist tradition "...which has always championed the virtues of the primitive band, the tribe, the village".¹⁰¹

[The counter culture's] instinctive fascination with magic and ritual, tribal lore, and psychedelic experience attempts to resuscitate the defunct shamanism of the distant past. In doing so, they wisely recognize that participative democracy cannot settle for being a matter of political-economic decentralism --

only that and nothing more. As long as the spell of objective consciousness grips our society, the regime of experts can never be far off; the community is bound to remain beholden to the high priests of the citadel who control access to reality.¹⁰²

Similarly, Roszak poses the question "How shall we, with intellectual conscience, enjoy so much of what science has with an abundance of empirical demonstration brought us, and then deny the essential truth of its world view"?¹⁰³ In reply, the reader is informed that magic has enjoyed respectability in its own day, by way of a history of shamanism; and we are told that "The trouble is, we don't trust to the way of the world".¹⁰⁴ Presumably, there is no place for electricity, vaccines, plumbing, etc., in the transcendent society, and the "ways of the world" are to include malaria, dysentery, syphilis, polio, typhus, typhoid, ad infinitum.

Primitivism seems inescapable, for there is no opportunity to compromise with the scientific and technical realms. On the one hand, the program for elimination of the technocracy depends upon the rejection of the scientific mode of thought; and secondly, those who experience the ecstasy of non-intellective consciousness must abandon "cerebral" pursuits.

To be sure, a single man may be capable at different times of both experiences, and this possibility leads us into serious errors. The physicist Max Born once reported, for example, what deep satisfaction he found translating German lyric poetry and what delight his scientist colleagues took in their musicianship. So too, Einstein was an avid violinist and the economist Keynes, a great patron of the ballet.

But one is reminded by such examples of the pathetic banker in T.S. Eliot's play The Confidential Clerk,

who found greater rewards in his secret avocation as a potter than in his public position as a financier.... A private passion for lyric poetry or the violin is no more than a quaint biographical detail in the career of an expert.¹⁰⁵

"At best, the artistically inclined person within a predominantly scientific culture lives a schizoid existence, finding an out-of-the-way corner of his life in which to pursue some creative use of his leisure time".¹⁰⁶ One can be sure that in Roszak's primitive artistic and mystical society, the pursuits of a Galileo, Salk, or Einstein would be certified (to use Laing's terminology) schizophrenic -- after all, they would be obviously lacking a "whole", "integrated" personality.

In conclusion, it should be noted that Roszak is concerned both with the uncertainty of the outcome of a cultural disjunction, and with certain undesirable (from his point of view) aspects of the counter culture. There is the problem, notes Roszak, "...of defining the ethical dignity of a cultural movement which takes radical issue with the scientific world view".¹⁰⁷

The project [of defining the ethical dignity of the counter culture] is vitally important because there must be a reply to the challenge raised by the many uneasy intellectuals who fear that the counter culture arrives, not trailing clouds of glory, but bearing the mark of the beast. No sooner does one speak of liberating the non-intellective powers of the personality than, for many, a prospect of the starkest character arises: a vision of rampant, antinomian mania, which in the name of permissiveness threatens to plunge us into a dark and savage age.¹⁰⁸

There are, concedes Roszak, unhealthy elements "around the fringes" of the counter culture: "Elements of pornographic grotesquery and bloodcurdling sadomasochism emerge again and

again in the art and theatre of our youth culture and intrude themselves constantly into the underground press".¹⁰⁹ In addition, there is the increasing escalation of drug dependency in the counter culture which threatens to become the "soma" of Huxley's Brave New World: "I think one must be prepared to take a very strong line on the matter and maintain that there are minds too small and too young for such psychic adventures -- and that the failure to recognize this fact is the beginning of disaster".¹¹⁰

The problem with those who fear that the release of the passions will inevitably lead to brutality, etc., is that they have misunderstood the traditional dichotomy: "...the opposition of reason and passion, intellect and feeling, the head and heart".¹¹¹ One can match every hot-blooded and impassioned act of cruelty with its counterpart motivated by cold-blooded intellectuality. The fact is, that "neither rationality nor passionate impulse, as they characterize styles of behaviour, guarantees anything about the ethical quality of action".¹¹² "Hitler may have postured like a Siegfried, but his henchmen were such children of the forest as knew how to make the trains run on time".¹¹³ Behind the Wagnerian facade, notes Roszak, there stood a masterpiece of social engineering.

The second problem (that of the undesirable aspects of the counter culture) is approached by Roszak in a rather oblique manner:

We enter a searching discussion of moral action only when we press beyond the surface style of conduct in which men express their ethical sensibilities and seek the hidden source from which their action flows... Our action gives voice to our total vision of life -- of the self and its proper place in the nature of things -- as we experience it most movingly... behind our socially certified morality some primordial world view which dictates what reality is, and what, within that reality, is to be held sacred.¹¹⁴

Roszak goes on to say that, although there is a strain of simulated mindlessness in the counter culture, there is also a strong influence of the world view of Lao-tzu, Buddha, and the Zen masters:

...a tradition that calls radically into question the validity of the scientific world view, the supremacy of cerebral cognition, the value of technical prowess; but does so in the most quiet and measured of tones, with humor, with tenderness, even with a deal of cunning argumentation.¹¹⁵

It appears that Roszak is making the empirical claim that (1) those who embrace Eastern religion will not commit evil acts; and (2) Eastern religion predominates, or will come to predominate, in the counter culture. Roszak's indictment of the technocracy is based, in part, upon the evil actions that are committed by men under the sway of the objective consciousness; and, he claims that under the sway of the non-intellective consciousness the "...personality becomes more beautiful, more creative, more humane than the search for objective correctness can make it".¹¹⁶

Both Reich and Roszak are irreconcilably opposed to what the former terms the "corporate state" and the latter calls the "technocracy"; both view the United States as a monolithic totalitarian state, and they both stress the mean-

inglessness, powerlessness, alienation, depersonalization, and loneliness that individuals suffer at the hands of an industrialized technological society. Roszak and Reich view the "counter culture" (read "Consciousness III" for Reich's terminology) as the only group capable of overthrowing the prevailing order; and both writers hold the values, beliefs and mores of the counter culture to be the only desirable alternatives to those of the prevailing order. The dynamic of social change is the conversion of more and more individuals to a new consciousness or "world-view". As great numbers of people transcend the objective consciousness (Consciousness II), they opt-out of the repressive technological society which then collapses as the result of this boycott.

Roszak's conversion model is closely related to the Zen concept of "satori"; a sudden enlightenment which can happen at any time. Roszak views the exposure of youth to the humanities in the universities as potentially revolutionary in that the white-hot authentic vision that can transform one's personality may be provided by "...one poem by Blake, one canvas by Rembrandt, one Buddhist sutra...."¹¹⁷ Roszak plays down the potential for enlightenment by drugs: viewing the drug experience as a "counterfeit infinity" with immense potential for exploitation by the technocracy.¹¹⁸ Reich, on the other hand, stresses no one road to enlightenment, but mentions factors such as the credibility gaps which have split the generations over issues such as the war in Vietman and the use of marijuana as the sources of youth's defection from

Consciousness II. The aspect common to both Reich and Roszak's positions is that the personality disjuncture which takes place involves the adoption of new values, beliefs and mores which are inimical to those of the technocracy. Reich sees the possibility of those values spreading to the working classes; Roszak does not.

Reich believes that technology and science, coupled with material abundance for all, can be reconciled with Consciousness III -- even businessmen and scientists can become "turned on". Roszak, deeply influenced by the disciplined asceticism of the Zen Buddhists, sets high standards for the counter culture to live up to: Reich holds up Consciousness III as a model for the lost souls of Consciousness II; Roszak has an additional model, one of his own design, to hold up to the counter culture.

Footnotes - Chapter II

¹ Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1969).

² Ibid., p. xiii.

³ Ibid., p. xii.

⁴ Ibid., p. xiii.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., p. xiv.

⁷ Roszak subsumes technology within the category of "science". The term "technocracy", as Roszak uses it, corresponds to Reich's "corporate state", while "objective consciousness" and "Consciousness II" are similarly interchangeable.

⁸ Roszak, op. cit., p. 5.

⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 9.

¹² Ibid., p. 8.

¹³ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 205.

- 18 Ibid., p. 208.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid., p. 212.
- 23 Ibid., p. 216.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid., p. 217.
- 26 Ibid., p. 218.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid., p. 220.
- 29 Ibid., p. 221.
- 30 Ibid., pp. 221-22.
- 31 Ibid., p. 222.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 222-23.
- 33 Ibid., p. 223.
- 34 Ibid., pp. 225-26.
- 35 Ibid., p. 227.
- 36 Ibid., p. 228.
- 37 Ibid., pp. 230-231.
- 38 Ibid., p. 269.

39 Ibid., p. 270. Roszak writes of Einstein: "Not long before his death, the greatest scientific mind since Newton confessed to the world that, if he had to choose over again, he would rather have been a good shoemaker. I have often felt that, long before he learns a single thing about mesons or information theory or DNA, every aspiring young scientist and technician in our schools should be confronted with that heartbroken [?] admission and forced to fathom its implications. But alas, I suspect there is in the great man's lament a pathos too deep any longer to be appreciated by the sorcerer's apprentices who crowd forward to disconcerting numbers to book passage on the technocratic gravy train".

40 Ibid., p. 272.

41 Ibid., p. 271.

42 Ibid., pp. 272-73.

43 Ibid., p. 272.

44 Ibid., p. 273.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 274.

48 Ibid., p. 275.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Roszak is on shaky ground when he presents Krech's failure to denounce the experiment under discussion as constituting an endorsement of the practices described. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the experiment took place in 1874.

53 Roszak, op. cit., pp. 275-76.

54 Ibid., p. 277-78.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 278.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 285.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 281.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 281-82.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 282.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 100.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., p. 22.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 24.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 34.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 102.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 34.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 203.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 201.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 202.

⁷²Ibid., p. 40.

⁷³Ibid., p. 41.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 42.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 42-43.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 43-44.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 44.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 48.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 49.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 50.

⁸²Ibid., p. 232.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 233.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 234.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 235.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 236.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 237.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 239.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 240.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 243.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 258.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 259.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 260.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 264.

¹⁰¹Ibid., pp. 264-65.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 265.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 241.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 249.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 255.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 74.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 159.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 76.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 79.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 78.

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 79-80.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 82.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 237.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 257.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

CHAPTER III

REVOLUTION

The Chinese philosopher Hsün Tsu, writing in the third century B.C., had this to say about the origin and use of names [concepts]: "Names were made in order to denote actualities,... and on the other hand to distinguish similarities and differences".¹ Disorder and social turmoil, according to Hsün Tsu, are the result of confusion deriving from the incorrect use of names; a condition always arising in the absence of a sage-king.

When things are alike, they are named alike; when different, they are named differently.... The one who knows that different actualities have different names, and who therefore never refers to different actualities otherwise than by different names, will not experience any confusion. Likewise he who refers to the same actualities should never use any other but the same names.²

Hsün Tsu, like Hobbes, believed that the function of the ruler and his government is to ensure domestic tranquility by rigidly enforcing the "correct" use of existing terms, and by authorizing the uniform adoption of new terms.³

Although the above is less an analysis of the causes of revolution than a reflection of the hunger for unity characteristic of periods of transition and uncertainty, the more specific problems of definition are germane to the present analysis of the counter cultural revolution. Is there a traditional meaning of the word "revolution"? What is (are) the generally accepted meaning(s) of the term? Given

the etymology of the word, do the "actualities" mentioned in the counter culture literature constitute a "revolution" at all? And, if so, in what senses of the word?

A common use of the term revolution, one that Plato and Aristotle were familiar with, refers to the replacement or overthrow of a government or constitution through the use of force, violence, or other illegitimate means. This broad definition of revolution would encompass successful rebellions, takeovers at the top ("coup d'état"), and seizure of power by means of fraud and deceit. Other cases subsumed under this definition of revolution include illegitimate changes in the constitution: changes in the locus of power such as the seizure of legislative power by the executive or the usurpation of judicial powers by the legislature. Usually, these changes would have to take place over a short period of time and in opposition to some group before the term revolution would seem appropriate. This use of "revolution" might be termed the "political" sense of that term.

A second meaning of "revolution", and one which might be called a "sociological" meaning of that term, refers to changes in the social structure so thorough, and taking place over such a short period of time, that the term "evolutionary" seems inadequate or inappropriate, and the term "revolution" becomes applicable. This is not to say that political and sociological revolutions are not interdependent -- that is, that widespread "social engineering" may not be the object of a political revolution, or, conversely, that the overthrow

of a government or political system cannot be the end result of a reordering of the patterns of power and interaction in the society at large.⁴

No attempt will be made here to exhaustively enumerate the entire range of possible uses of the terms "revolution" and "revolutionary". The usages omitted include a variety which refer to complete or sudden changes in general; as well as those which tell us more about the enthusiasms of the perceiver than they do about quantitative or qualitative changes in that which is perceived. Instances of the latter would include examples of the current penchant for phrases such as "the revolution in men's hair styles", "the pantyhose revolution", and the like.

Perhaps the first thinker to systematically organize his observations about social and political change was Plato. The Republic⁵ is an attempt to set forth the conditions necessary for the establishment of a just society -- a society which, because of Plato's conception of justice, would necessarily be free from the divisions and internal strife (statis) which cause revolutions.⁶ Much of the exhaustive detail in the Republic concerning marriage, child rearing, education, and the property limitations of the guardians constitutes an attempt to provide institutional safeguards against the factors leading to statis and revolution.

Plato sets out a five-part classification of governments (this becomes a frequent classification if, as Plato suspected, his ideal state is an impossibility) and then pro-

ceeds to discuss how each one succumbs to revolution:

Is it not a simple fact that in any form of government revolution always starts from the outbreak of internal dissention in the ruling class?⁷

This notion of the cause of revolution is expanded somewhat to include divisions of the entire society into classes. This division follows that introduction of private ownership which assures the conditions necessary for "...diversity, inequality, and disharmony [which] will beget, as they always must, enmity and war. Such, everywhere, is the birth and lineage of civil strife".⁸

Aristotle's efforts go well beyond Plato. Book V of the Politics⁹ is entirely devoted to the study of revolutions and their causes. Like Plato, Aristotle's views on political change and instability are intricately linked to a notion of justice, in this case that which involves the relationship between proportional and numerical equality. "Equality" in the proportional sense means something like "fair" and the related justice notion involves distributing rewards, power, and position in accordance with merit and deserts.

...men are quite right in not to take any and every kind of inequality [difference] into account in discussing distribution of offices, but only those which are relevant, that is to say, those which contribute to making up the state as a whole, not such qualities as swiftness of foot, however important that may be in athletic contests.¹⁰

The difficulty, of course, arises when agreement is sought about what is relevant, and if that is once agreed upon, about the relative value of the relevant differences.

But while men agree that absolute justice is proportionate justice based on value, they differ, as has been said before, about the value.¹¹

This is not the place to enter upon an analysis of the justice problems of the Politics, it suffices to mention that Aristotle included good birth, education and intelligence, property ownership, and numerical superiority as relevant differences.

Aristotle initially divides governments into two general categories; rule by the few, oligarchy; and rule by the many, democracy. The oligarchs, who are superior in one respect, usually wealth, come to believe that they are superior in all respects and demand a greater share in everything. Democrats, recognizing that they are equal in some respects, claim equal participation in everything.

And this is why, whenever the members of a state cease to regulate their sharing in it according to its fundamental principle in each case, they find themselves in a situation of potential revolution.¹²

The changes that result from inequality may be classified according to whether they modify an existing constitution, or whether they completely replace one constitution with another. In one case the revolution may replace oligarchy with democracy, in the other the revolutionaries desire to keep the same form of government but to assert themselves as its agents. Changes can also be of degree as well as kind: some may want the oligarchy to be more broadly based, others more narrowly. Similarly, individuals and groups may desire the extension of democracy, others wish to circumscribe

it further.

As I was saying, inequality is generally at the bottom of internal warfare in states, for it is in the striving for what is fair and equal that men become divided.¹³

Inequality, once established, sets the stage for men to perceive themselves as unfairly excluded from wealth, dignity, power, and position:

For those who are bent on equality start a revolution if they believe that they, having less, are yet the equals of those that have more. And so too do those who aim at inequality and superiority, if they think that they, being unequal, are not getting more, but equal or less.¹⁴

Other associated examples include the desire for profit and dignity for their own sake, and the desire to avoid losses in wealth and status by fomenting revolution. Men also become aroused to revolution when they observe that profit, dignity, and honour are bestowed willy-nilly without regard to merit and deserts.

An important cause of revolution, according to Aristotle, lies in the disproportionate growth of one segment of the society. This can happen when property qualifications for citizenship are reduced resulting in an increase in the numbers in the lower classes. Similarly, the loss of large numbers of the upper classes in warfare can precede a move from oligarchy to democracy. On the other hand, periods of prosperity, resulting in greater wealth for those already well off, or resulting in an increase in the numbers of the wealthy, can alter the power relationships in the society and lead to oligarchy.¹⁵

Other social factors which lead to revolution include the polarization of society into factions, i.e., the decline of the middle classes; the growth of power in one organ of government; and jealousies and disputes among the leading citizens.

The important thing to remember is that those who are responsible for the exercise of power, whether they be individuals or organs of government or tribes or what you will, great or small, it is they who cause the disturbance that leads to revolution. They may do so indirectly, as when the rest, jealous of their power, begin a revolution, but also directly, when they themselves are so superior that they are no longer content to remain on terms of equality with the rest.¹⁶

These changes can be accomplished without violence through "...lobbying and intrigue, lack of vigilance, and change so gradual as to become imperceptible...."¹⁷

The rest of Aristotle's discussion is devoted to an examination of the dissolution of various forms of government; democracies, oligarchies, aristocracies, monarchies, and, unlike Plato, tyrannies as well.¹⁸ Interjected between the sections dealing with aristocracy and monarchy are two chapters concerned with the preservation of constitutions. Here, as in the more general sections dealing with revolution, Aristotle's observations include institutional, sociological, and personal factors influencing the stability of constitutions.

In conclusion, Aristotle launches an attack upon Plato's cyclical "theory" of revolution, seemingly oblivious to the allegorical character of that section. In criticizing Plato's account of the rise of oligarchy, Aristotle writes:

I cannot accept his notion that change into oligarchy is due to the fact that those who hold office are fond of money and fond of making money, and not rather to the fact that the extremely wealthy do not think it right that those who are not possessed of any property should participate in the state of equal terms with those who are.... Without any person becoming poorer than he was, men may yet change from oligarchy to democracy, if the poor become more numerous; and from democracy to oligarchy when the wealthy are stronger than the people, so long as the one party is fully intent and the other not alive to the situation.... What counts in creating a revolutionary situation is not whether the all is spent, but whether honours and privileges are fully shared, and whether people are unfairly treated or ill-used.... There are many different oligarchies and democracies, but Socrates speaks of their revolutions as if there were only one of each.¹⁹

Surely this is more valuable as an insight concerning Aristotle's views than as a criticism of Plato.

Although we find many scholars devoting their energies to the subject of revolution in the period between Aristotle and Marx, almost none except Machiavelli are concerned with causes. The overriding question for Augustine, Thomas, Luther, Calvin, Knox, Harrington, Locke, and Burke, as well as for the author of Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, was not how revolutions were to be brought about, but under which circumstances revolutions were justified, if at all. Machiavelli, the lone exception, devoted his efforts exclusively to the study of revolution associated with the term coup d' état. As he so forthrightly put it:

It seems to me proper now to treat of conspiracies, being a matter of so much danger both to princes and subjects; for history teaches us that many more princes have lost their lives and their states by conspiracies than by open war. But few can venture to make open war upon their sovereign, whilst everyone may engage in conspiracies against him.²⁰

Since the task that Machiavelli sets for himself is to suggest policies by which the prudent prince can avoid the pitfalls of sedition and conspiracy, there is little to gain from his observations which would contribute anything useful to the present enquiry concerning the counter cultural revolution.

Both Plato and Aristotle mention economic elements as important contributing factors in the movement of society towards stasis. One must note, however, that while Plato believed that diversity, enmity, and war are assured by the existence of private ownership alone, Aristotle treats disparities in the distribution of wealth and property as one factor among many which might lead to civil strife. On Aristotle's view, a society with an economic system which concentrates wealth and power in the hands of a few and which reduces a large sector of the population to abject poverty will be as stable as any other society if the losers in the system perceive their position as resulting from a fair and just distribution. Thus, there is no possibility of predicting the likelihood of revolution by an analysis of the socio-economic structure of society alone; one must only determine what individuals think about the system of distribution. If individuals perceive themselves as unfairly excluded or ill treated, they may revolt; there is no necessity for objective inequalities of distribution.

Aristotle's views on revolution serve as a point of departure for two later approaches: the "psychological", and

the "sociological". Included in the sociological category are writers such as Tocqueville,²¹ Brinton,²² Davies,²³ and Johnson,²⁴ to mention only a few. Some of the contributors to the psychological approach to civil strife and revolution include Gurr,²⁵ Feirabend,²⁶ Tanter and Midlarsky.²⁷ An accepted notion of revolution consists of the successful rebellion -- one that displaces the existing government and replaces it with another. Since rebellions are characterized by mass-movements and mob violence, many attempts to explain the causes of revolution have concentrated upon the psychology of crowds and leaders. Among those pursuing this line of enquiry were Le Bon,²⁸ Freud,²⁹ Wolfenstein,³⁰ and Hoffer.³¹

Tocqueville and Brinton suggest that economic improvement is the prelude to revolution, while Davies had maintained that a period of improvement and hope followed by a sudden setback triggers rebellion.

The crucial factor is the vague or specific fear that ground gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost. This fear does not generate if there is continued opportunity to satisfy continually emerging needs; it generates when the existing government suppresses or is blamed for suppressing such opportunity.³²

One troublesome aspect of these approaches is that societies are continually in a process of economic advance and decline and the problem becomes one of explaining why a revolution takes place during one advance or decline and not another. There is also the problem of stipulating why any particular dissatisfied group rebels, and another, suffering equal deprivation, does not.

Psychologists have attempted to fill the causal gap between particular socio-economic conditions and revolution by examining how these variables interact with the psychological field of the individual in a way which motivates revolutionary behaviour. The conceptual frameworks vary greatly: some, such as Gurr, utilize a frustration-aggression model in conjunction with the concept of relative deprivation; i.e., the discrepancy between group value expectations and value realizations. Freud, on the other hand, conceived of the term "social anxiety" to account for individual conformity to societal norms. Social anxiety stems from the fear of peer-group disapproval. Submergence in a crowd allows the individual to abdicate responsibility for his behaviour; thus overcoming the anxiety individuals might feel about behaving violently. The element needed to change a group into a crowd, on Freud's view, is the leader, whose self-confidence allows the group to adopt sibling relationships among each other, and a child-parent relationship with the leader. All responsibility for decision-making falls upon the father-leader, leaving the members of the crowd to settle into the secure but dependent role of children. Thus, the study of the causes of revolution, or at least the crowd mobilization aspects of revolutions, from the Freudian perspective, may well center around an analysis of leadership.³³

The problem of bridging the gap between socio-economic factors and action by individuals and groups has not been ignored by the more recent students of revolution. Johan

Galtung's structural theory of aggressive behaviour is based upon the frustration-aggression model, but takes into account social structure and socio-economic changes. He hypothesizes that a deprived segment of the population will not rebel until they have achieved status and some self-respect in one segment of society, but are prevented from achieving status in others. The minimum achievement in education, the economic sphere, or in the political realm gives them the confidence, self-esteem, and resources necessary to attempt change.

One might mention in passing the work of Smelser who utilizes the concept of "anomie" (after Durkheim), and the mainstream theorists in political sociology and political science; Deutsch, Pye, and Kornhauser, who concentrate upon what they sometimes term "internal war" associated with "under-developed" nations. According to this popular viewpoint, conflict is to be expected as a result of the destruction of "traditional societies" by industrialization. Lucian Pye asserts that

...within highly complex industrial societies, it is almost impossible for political controversies to develop to the point of sustained and organized violence.... The relative immunity to insurgency of highly complex industrial societies, at the one extreme, and of homogeneously integrated traditional communities, at the other, points to the crucial reason why the problem of insurgency is so closely related at this time in history to the transitional and underdeveloped new nations of the world.³⁴

Deutsch's position seems more universally applicable, at least in principle (Pye's assertion being controverted by the events of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, France, Northern Ireland, Quebec,

and the U.S.): Deutsch maintains, in a position similar to Galtung's in some respects, that the elements in society which are socially mobile, but who are not assimilated into the political and social processes, are most likely to behave aggressively towards the prevailing sources of authority. A major problem which will seem obvious to the reader lies in the definition of "social mobility" and "assimilation", as well as the lack of specificity of what could count as "aggressive" behaviour. Presumably these problems could be coped with; it would remain to be seen whether a rigorous definition of these terms would diminish the generality of the model's applicability.

No review of the literature on revolution and its causes would be complete without considering the contribution of Karl Marx. Marx in no way neglected the psychological aspects of revolution, but if categorization were essential (which it isn't) one would probably include his work in the sociological category.

Marx believed that there was ample evidence to support his claim that the particular psychological configuration of individuals in any society, as part of the "superstructure", arise out of the objective economic conflicts of that society. This is not to maintain that everyone in a capitalist society will be permeated with the same attitudes, beliefs, and values; or to say that everyone in a particular class will be psychologically "the same".³⁵ This writer speculates that if Marx had narrowly devoted himself to the study of "psychology", an

unlikely prospect to say the least, he would have developed something very similar to the Gestalt school of thought.

A popular conception of Marx's analysis of revolution derives in part from the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848). In it Marx notes that the history of society is the history of class struggle of one form or another. Another way of putting this is to say that changes in social structure, as well as in custom, morality, and all the other patterns of behaviour can be understood by examining the factors which account for objective changes in power between opposing groups. This view has influenced the analysis of social change by Marxist and non-Marxist alike. An explicit articulation of Marx's general conceptual framework can be drawn from the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:³⁶

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society -- the real foundation on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.³⁷

Earlier epochs were characterized by gradations between patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves, lords, vassals, guild masters, journeymen, apprentices, and serfs, etc.

Sweezy, in his work entitled The Theory of Capitalist Deve-

lopment,³⁸ points out that the classical economists were also concerned with the economic roots of class conflict: "...but the social antagonism which occupied most of their attention, both intellectual and emotional, was the conflict between industrial capitalists and landlords".³⁹ Marx's contribution, according to Sweezy, must be understood in terms of his turn from the preoccupation with rent and landed property to an analysis beginning with capital. "The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones".⁴⁰ In place of the conflict between lord and vassal, landlord and serf, patrician and plebeian, associated with past epochs, the bourgeois epoch's contribution to class struggle was that of simplification: "Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat".⁴¹

As the bourgeoisie extend the productive forms of capitalism the forces of production undermine the very property relations of bourgeois society.

It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodic return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products but also of the previously created productive forces are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that in all earlier epochs would have seemed an absurdity -- the epidemic of overproduction.⁴²

The impossibility of selling all the goods produced necessitates an aggressive exploitation of new markets and a more thorough exploitation of old ones. Crises are postponed "...by paving the way for more extensive and more constructive crises, and by diminishing the means by which crises are prevented".⁴³

As capitalism expands in search of new markets it engenders the formation of a new class, "...a class of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital".⁴⁴ Capitalism displaces the inefficient production of the artisan -- a system employing many more workers to produce less goods than the system of mechanized factory industry -- thereby ensuring a surplus of labour which, in turn, assures the capitalist that "...the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for his maintenance and for the propagation of his race".⁴⁵ As more machinery is employed and the division of labour increases, the wage decreases and the work becomes more menial, fragmented, and demeaning.

At first the response of the proletariat to their exposure to the "vicissitudes of competition" and the fluctuations of the market is limited to random acts of violence: "...they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages".⁴⁶ The proletariat is an

incoherent mass at this stage; divided by competition with one another in the job market. Soon, however, the recognition of their common plight unites them into an ever increasing cohesive unit. The recurring economic crises and the rise of monopolies forces more and more of the lower middle class -- the artisan and small merchant whose skills have been rendered uncompetitive -- into allegiance with the proletariat.

Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands.⁴⁷

The proletariat, unlike previous classes that gained the upper hand, have no "conditions of appropriation" to force upon bourgeois society; therefore, "...their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property".⁴⁸

This early Marxist analysis of capitalism is the probable source of a popular notion that Marx's theory of revolution rests upon his prediction of the inevitable increase of the impoverishment of the worker: "Anti-Marxists have always maintained the falsity of this law [the law of the increasing misery of the proletariat] and have deduced from this the incorrectness of Marx's analysis of capitalism. Some Marxists, on the other hand, have been equally concerned to demonstrate the truth of the law, and so a controversy producing much heat and little light has raged for more than

half a century".⁴⁹ Sweezy attributes this controversy to a misunderstanding of Marx's method. The "law of the increasing misery of the proletariat", on Sweezy's view, is a "high-level abstraction" subject, as all abstractions are, to modification in terms of the particular circumstances of its application.⁵⁰ Thus, Marx's early formulation assumes the character of a mental exercise or heuristic: subject to further modification; or, if it proves conceptually inadequate, it can be discarded altogether.

As it turns out, this view may not have been altogether inaccurate. Martin Nicolaus, in The Unknown Marx,⁵¹ assesses the importance of Marx's untranslated manuscript, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie, as an insight into what the theory of revolution would look like which is promised in the Preface to The Critique of Political Economy and which is hinted at in portions of Capital.

The Preface [of the Critique] outlines a whole world-view, a set of scientific doctrines which explains the movement of history in its sociological, political and economic dimensions, and demonstrates how and why the present organization of society must collapse from the internal strain of its conflicts, to be replaced by a higher order of civilization. The published chapters, however, demonstrate no such breadth, nor is the ultimate emergence of a new order clearly derivable from their content.... What, then, was Marx talking about in the Preface? Was he making claims for theories he had not yet constructed, for ideas he had not yet written down?⁵²

The writings of Bernstein, Kautsky, and Luxemburg can be seen as attempts to fill the gaps posed by these questions; but it is the Grundrisse, according to Nicolaus, which supplies the new Marxian framework upon which an analysis of the decline

of advanced capitalism can be based.

Marx's earlier economics concentrated upon the deleterious effects of competition upon the worker: it explored the logical conclusions of an extension of competition among the workers as the result of increasing mechanization and monopolistic tendencies. "In the Grundrisse [Marx] analyses systematically, and for the first time in his work, the economics of production".⁵³

The Preface to The Critique of Political Economy contains the following explicit reference to the alleged preconditions of revolution in capitalist society:

At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or, -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.⁵⁴

According to Nicolaus, Marx held that the "relations of production" are not just legal-political forms such as property relations. Property relations are "...merely an expression of these relations".⁵⁵ It is money which, in bourgeois society, allows for an "exchange value": the capitalist extracts some "surplus value" by paying the worker for his labour power at its "exchange value"; i.e., the amount needed to supply his natural wants, such as food, clothing, fuel, and housing. Individuals must have need of the products produced, and must also have the money to

buy them: "These twin imperatives are characterized by Marx as historically produced social relations specific to the capitalist form of production".⁵⁶

The "material forces of production" are the result of the extraction of surplus value from labour power and consist of not only the machinery of production, but are themselves a product of social organization, "...the productive process is a social process for Marx".⁵⁷ In a capitalist system

...on the one hand, production consists of an act of exchange, and on the other,... it is the forcible appropriation of the worker's world-creating power.... At the beginning and at the end of the productive process lies the social imperatives of exchange-values yet from beginning to end the productive process must yield surplus values.... This contradiction, inherent in the process of capitalist production, is the source of the conflicts which Marx expected to bring about the period of social revolution.⁵⁸

There are four economic-political alternatives which capitalism could attempt in the face of the above contradiction, but which are inconsistent with the overriding aim of capitalism itself: (1) Wages might be raised to increase demand; (2) Less surplus-value could be extracted; (3) Products could be distributed without regard to demand; (4) Production could be curtailed to match reductions in demand. "The first and second alternatives result in a reduction of profit; the third is capitalistically impossible (except as a political stop-gap) [the Lockheed precedent?]; and the fourth means depression".⁵⁹

Under at least one variation of capitalist decline it is not the impoverishment of the worker that leads to revolu-

tion. The historic role of capital is not fulfilled, under this conception, until "...the level of needs has been developed

...to the degree where surplus labour in addition to necessary subsistence has itself become a general need which manifests itself in individual needs,... and (finally) when the development of the productive powers of labour... have ripened to the point where the possession and maintenance of societal wealth require no more than a diminished amount of labour-time,... where, that is, human labour which can be replaced by the labour of things has ceased.⁶⁰

Marx predicts a capitalist society so automated that the breakdown of the economic order takes place in the absence of a large and impoverished working class.

As soon as labour in its direct form has ceased to be the great wellspring of wealth, labour-time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and therefore exchange-value the measure of use-value.... With that, the system of production based on exchange value collapsesCapital is its own contradiction-in-process, for its urge is to reduce labour-time to a minimum, while at the same time it maintains that labour-time is the only measure and source of wealth.⁶¹

The above seems to undeniably controvert Marx's central thesis that labour-power is the source of value; unless, of course, "wealth" as used here has a meaning all its own; distinct from any associated meanings of "value".

The reader may well wonder if Marx has entirely dropped the psychological aspects of alienation and class-consciousness from his earlier analysis of revolution. It would seem that the schema for capitalist breakdown put forth in the Grundrisse has little need for dissatisfaction leading to mass-movements: the system seems to collapse from a technical difficulty with little need for human intervention.

A number of variants of Marxism have emerged with divergent views about both the making of a socialist revolution, and the very nature of that revolution itself. Roughly speaking, one can identify three major schools of thought: (1) the Social Democratic; (2) the Bolshevik; and (3) the "New Left".

(1) The Social Democrats focus upon trade unionism and the attempt to educate the working class so that in perceiving the causes of their plight, they might elect a socialist government. The roots of this movement could be said to lie in the Second International which represents the thoughts of theorists such as Bernstein, Kautsky, and Luxemburg.⁶²

(2) The Bolsheviks concentrate upon a small party, the "vanguard", which prepares the groundwork which they feel is necessary for a successful revolution. The recurring economic crises of capitalism presents the vanguard with concrete issues upon which to build a social base for revolutionary change. The guarantee of the inevitable recurrence of these periodic crises also assures the party that the opportunity for success will present itself over and over again -- all that is needed is perserverence, organization, and time.

(3) The "New Left" is a heterogeneous assortment of groups and individuals in the anarchist-syndicalist tradition. Participatory democracy, decentralization of power, and public ownership are recurring themes in this movement. However, the anti-ideological character of the "New Left", coupled with their recalcitrance to exclude any points of view (which,

of course, renders them susceptible to being associated with any extremists in their numbers in the public eye) makes it very difficult to delineate their principles. One might note that it was in the New Left's fight against racial discrimination and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam that the "counter culture" found many of the tactics, attitudes, and beliefs that shape its notion of "revolution". Many of the members of the "counter culture" are themselves veterans of the New Left activism which marked the past decade.

Reich and Roszak believe that the spontaneous adoption of new attitudes, values, and beliefs is a sufficient condition for social and political change.

It will not work to educate first, and then change individual lives later. A change of consciousness must precede a new and enlarged understanding of our society,....⁶³

People change society by dropping-out and changing their habits of consumption as well as their life-styles. Revolution, as conceived by Reich and Roszak, takes the form of a free-market situation: "Should Consciousness III sweep the country, the federal government could simply be ignored until it became completely isolated from the people of the nation, and had no choice but to change".⁶⁴ Everyone knows that if a company cannot sell a product, it must change the product or go out of business.

It is difficult to believe that anyone should be so naive about the distribution of power and privilege in the United States. For Reich and Roszak there are only two ways

to exercise power in society: either by force of arms or through the control of consciousness. "Power is not exercised in this country by force of arms, as in some dictatorships. Power rests on control of consciousness".⁶⁵ Since the United States is not a dictatorship, Reich and Roszak assume that power is limited to the activities of advertisers, public relations men, and government information agencies. Ultimately, power is seen to rest upon institutions, such as the family and the educational system, which inculcate the population with the values of the technocracy.

Since the problem is formulated in terms of false consciousness, Reich and Roszak's solutions are analogous to a campaign against false advertising. The populace has been led astray and persists in buying an unworthy product -- if citizens were truly "rational" consumers, the company (e.g., the technocracy and its government) would fold. Therefore, the task of revolution, as conceived by Reich and Roszak, is to counter the myths of objective consciousness with the message from Consciousness III, thus restoring rationality to the marketplace.

The realities of interest group politics and of disparities of wealth, education, access to information, etc., which make individuals and groups unequal in the extent to which they are vulnerable to many different forms of coercion are all ignored by Reich and Roszak. Instead, they paint a picture of a "free-market" society where no one enters into contracts unwillingly, where all political alternatives are

given equal access to the consumer, but where only the consumer's values stand between him and a better product". This view of society, (completely devoid of vested interests, selfish individuals, and power seekers) makes comprehensible Reich and Roszak's departure from the revolutionary theory of Plato, Aristotle, Marx, and of contemporary social scientists.

Reich and Roszak present no evidence which would lead the reader to view contemporary American society as so unique with respect to factors such as wealth, power, and influence that the observations about social change and revolution discussed by the thinkers presented in this chapter would become obsolete. Until the case is made that traditional theories of social change are inapplicable to contemporary American society, there seems to be no good reason to accept the assertion that radical social change is impossible except through the counter culture.

The characteristics which are common to the revolutionary theories discussed in this chapter all center around objective differences in condition, power, prestige, etc., between individuals and between groups. Different theorists place different weights upon the significance of various aspects of the problem of revolution: Plato, for instance, stresses the importance of divisions in society per se, he assumes that men will place evaluations upon these divisions and that they will act on the basis of their evaluations. Aristotle assumes that any society will entail differences

in treatment and differences in distribution of goods, punishments, and rewards, but stresses the importance of the evaluations that men place upon these inequalities.

The Marxist acknowledges that various political systems allow for greater and lesser ranges of peaceful decision-making and conflict resolution, but claims that confrontation between classes is inevitable because the range of decisions which can be resolved within a given political system is limited: at best a political system can only reflect the de facto distribution of power and wealth within a society. He will note that no ruling class has willingly given up its powers and privileges except as a means of prolonging its hold upon the levers of power and he will conclude that sooner or later the ruling class will always resort to violence to preserve its position.

Whether or not there are exceptions to the Marxist claim is a matter for empirical investigation. Moreover, the question still remains as to the inevitability of conflict and as to the nature and form that confrontation must take. However, the examination of the notable thinkers on revolution undertaken in this chapter would suggest that Reich and Roszak have too narrowly circumscribed their discussion of revolution by focusing on value change at the expense of an investigation of objective factors such as differences in power, wealth, and position. The lessons of past history lend credence to the view that there is more to solving the problems of social injustice in the United States than changing individual life-styles and values.

Footnotes - Chapter III

¹ Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Derk Bodde (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 151.

² Ibid., pp. 151-52.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Anchor Books, 1955), p. ix.

⁵ Plato, The Republic, trans. McDonald Cornford (London: Oxford University Press, 1941).

⁶ Plato acknowledges that even his ideal state would probably fall prey to change, although he is unable to tell Glaucon where the breakdown will begin:

"Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses to tell us 'how division first came',...?"

Ibid., p. 268.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., p. 270.

⁹ Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962).

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 129.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 191.

¹² Ibid., p. 190.

¹³ Ibid., p. 191.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 192.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 194-95.

- 16 Ibid., p. 199.
- 17 Ibid., p. 195.
- 18 Ibid., p. 233.
- 19 Ibid., p. 234.
- 20 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), p. 410.
- 21 Tocqueville, loc. cit.
- 22 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Ronald Press, 1958).
- 23 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, XXVII (February, 1962).
- 24 Johnson, Chalmers A., Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).
- 25 Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife", American Political Science Review, LXI (December, 1968).
- 26 Ivo K. Feirabend and Rosalind L. Feirabend, "Aggressive Behavior Within Politics", Journal of Conflict Resolution (September, 1966).
- 27 Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution, XXXI (September, 1967).
- 28 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969).
- 29 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (New York: Bantam Books, 1960).
- 30 Victor E. Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Ghandi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
- 31 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951).

32 Davies, loc. cit., p. 8.

33 "Leadership" should be understood in an extended sense which includes the notion of an ideal or aspiration around which a movement can be focused. See Georges Sorel, Reflection on Violence (London: Collier Books, 1950) for a discussion of the centrality of myth to mass action.

34 Lucian Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency", Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 163.

35 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in C. Wright Mills, The Marxists (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 41-43.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., pp. 41-42.

38 Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1942).

39 Ibid., p. 15.

40 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959), p. 8.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 13.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., p. 14.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 17.

48 Ibid., p. 18.

49 Sweezy, loc. cit., p. 19.

50 Ibid., pp. 133-34.

51 Martin Nicolaus, "The Unknown Marx", New Left Review, No. 48 (March-April, 1968), p. 42.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., p. 46.

54 Sweezy, loc. cit., p. 14.

55 Nicolaus, loc. cit., p. 54.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., p. 55.

59 Ibid., p. 57.

60 Ibid., p. 58.

61 Ibid., p. 59.

62 Mills, loc. cit., chapters 7 and 8.

63 Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 318.

64 Ibid., p. 331.

65 Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

REICH AND ROSZAK: A CRITIQUE

A natural starting point for criticism and appraisal of The Greening of America and The Making of a Counter Culture is with the conception of American society as being under the domination of a monolithic totalitarian state. What do Reich and Roszak mean when they characterize the United States as "totalitarian"?

Reich takes the stronger position when he specifically mentions wiretapping, eavesdropping, and other "elaborate methods of official surveillance", which are characteristic of the police state, and charges that through these methods, the state regulates every aspect of life; public and private (see Chapter I, page 10, above). To what extent this is the case is an empirical question, but more importantly; there are the additional factors of whether this control can be properly termed "monolithic", and the question of the legitimacy of the alleged regulation. It is not enough to establish that almost every aspect of a society's existence is subject to regulation: important factors to be considered include whether or not that regulation is arbitrary, repressive, or unjust.

Reich's reference to the existence of widespread surveillance, including the photographing of demonstrators, wiretapping, police searches, etc., could be supplemented by

the well-known practice of the filing of dossiers on individuals by government agencies, but more frequently, by private firms such as credit agencies, banks, insurance companies, and the like.

Recently, the Judiciary Sub-committee on Constitutional Rights has begun hearings for the purpose of devising means to safeguard the political liberties of U.S. citizens from what they term "dossier dictatorship". The committee will hear evidence on assorted public and private agencies that keep dossiers on individual citizens in the hope that it will lead to the formulation of "privacy" legislation giving persons the right to know about any information that is on file about them and giving them the opportunity to rebut any inaccurate data.¹

One might also mention that in connection with the incidents of lawbreaking by police, both in the gathering of evidence and in the mistreatment of demonstrators and prisoners, the crucial point, and one that seems strangely lost on Reich, a law professor yet, is the overwhelming number of cases which are either dropped or overturned on grounds of the inadmissibility of illegally gathered evidence.

In a move which thwarted Attorney General John Mitchell from bypassing the regulations concerning wiretapping, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered him to get court approval for wiretaps and to disclose wiretap evidence to trial judges so that they could determine if it was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court up-

held a lower court ruling which told the Government to heed the rules on wiretapping or to drop the case against three members of the White Panther Party charged with conspiracy in connection with the bombing of a C.I.A. office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.²

The truth of the matter is that "police riots", violations of due process and the rights of the accused have been subjected to increasing criticism in all the major news media. This may be, in part, the reason for an increased demand, especially on the part of ghetto residents, for such things as civilian police review boards and appeal commissions. A state which does not monopolize the dissemination of information, and in which one agency of government, such as the judiciary, actively attempts to safeguard the populace from arbitrary treatment at the hands of the other branches of government can hardly be termed totalitarian in the same sense as Nazi Germany. The dangers that can follow from the misleading and imprecise use of emotive terms are well articulated in the following quotation from a critique of Herbert Marcuse by Alasdair MacIntyre concerning a similar loose usage of the term "totalitarian":

...the very use of the word "totalitarian" to refer to liberal institutions blurs essential differences in a way analogous to that in which the use of the term "social Fascist" by communists of social democrats in Germany in the late twenties and early thirties fatally -- and the word "fatally" is not metaphorical -- obscured for communists the difference between their differences with social democrats and their differences with Nazis.³

With the exception of Reich's initial reference to alleged Gestapo-like characteristics of American society, his remaining analysis of the Corporate State largely agrees with Roszak's portrayal of the "technocracy". Their portraits of society use the terms totalitarian "control" and "regulation", but the terms "influence" or "effect" come much closer to the reality which Reich and Roszak portray than does the term "control".

The statements "X affects Y", and "X controls Y", have meanings that can be well differentiated for the purposes of the present analysis.

The statement that "X affects Y", in the sense that some state or activity of X has implications for, or entails certain consequences for Y, or that some state or activity of Y is the result of an activity or state of X, can encompass situations as diverse as that where, if X occupies space Z, then Y cannot occupy space Z; to the case where, if X does M, Y dies. On the other hand, to say that "X controls Y" is to maintain that there is a relationship between X and Y such that Y's actions are contingent upon the desires of X. If X controls Y with regard to some activity A, then if X wants A performed, Y must comply with X's desires, and, furthermore, Y cannot perform A in opposition to X's wishes. "Control", as it is customarily used, denotes a much stronger relationship than "affect". If it is said that X controls Y, then the actions of Y are in some sense determined by X; a necessary and sufficient condition for Y doing A is that X

desires it.

The pervasiveness, degree, and quality of an effect, as well as the relationship between the agent and those who are affected, must be delineated fairly precisely in a definition of totalitarianism. The destruction of a cotton crop in Argentina may affect persons all over the world in one way or another (by a rise in the cost of clothing, etc.), but one would not describe the relationship between the Argentinian farmer and those affected as totalitarian. Totalitarianism is thought to have something to do with sovereignty; the power to make laws and enforce them. It is a specific form of government exercising power and using force in a society. Furthermore, although the powers of the state may pervade every aspect of the society's existence, it is important to examine the sources of authority of these powers. There is a great deal of difference between the arbitrary and unlimited power exercised by an autocrat and the power exercised under law by an agent of the governed with the consent of the governed -- even if the decisions of both the autocrat and the "agent" affect every aspect of their respective societies. On the one hand there exists absolute and centralized control over the governmental institutions, and on the other there exists some mechanism of control capable of putting power in the hands of the governed.

Actually, if the United States were a totalitarian state both Reich and Roszak's problems would be greatly simplified; for then there would be a clearly defined source of

responsibility for the evils of society in opposition to which one might organize a revolutionary movement. But the totalitarianism which Roszak and Reich speak about is in fact the structure of society itself; they are like displaced nomads in a stationary agricultural society -- "This society is permeated by the agricultural imperative", the nomad says, "...all roles and relationships are mediated by the irresistible urge to cultivate.... The need to be transient, to wander, to hunt and to gather are ruthlessly exorcised out of human existence by the mindless drive to raise more and more crops... agriculture demands that one raise animals and pasturage, it demands that one wear bib-overalls, a straw hat and a checkered shirt... it is a totalitarian system".

This parody may seem superficial, and indeed, it is. But it dramatizes the dilemma that Reich and Roszak face: like the nomad they ask "Who is responsible for maintaining this oppressive system"? "Why don't these people rebel"? The conclusion must be that they have been "brainwashed". But by whom? The answer that Reich and Roszak give to this question is "By no one". It is the system itself which brainwashes its members; it is responsible through them for its own perpetuation and for all the evils of society. Thus, for Reich and Roszak the task of revolution begins by "un-brainwashing" the members of society; for if they are truly brainwashed, a mere change in the structure of institutions will merely be reversed by those who are conditioned to desire that structure. In addition, there is more to the evils

of the technocracy than the external policies of the experts and the technicians: the most pernicious damage that the technocracy has done is to the psyche itself -- loss of self and the alienative dichotomy.

This is a happy outlook in one sense, since there are no enemies that one must confront; no troublesome ethical dilemmas to resolve concerning recalcitrant holdouts who are just bloody-minded and beyond reason: those who are still faithful to Mammon including capitalists, jailers, commissars, technicians, and scientists, are just the victims of a misguided and perverse system. Roszak slips out of this framework briefly in his discussion of the experts and scientists (see Chapter II, pp. 40-1 above), and it becomes very difficult to believe that the scientists are merely dupes of the objective consciousness; instead, they begin to take on the appearance of culpable and evil men.

The problem is that in their haste to place the blame for society's evils on the shoulders of "technology", "industrialism", "objective consciousness", "the technocracy", "the Corporate State", etc., Reich and Roszak too easily absolve real flesh and blood human beings from any responsibility for their actions.

Reich and Roszak are at one in their portrayal of the psychological damage that is inflicted by the technocracy. Reich emphasizes the impact of the material relations of production (industrialization, bureaucracy, organization, technology, and the market, etc.) and the rise of contractual

role-relationships upon the individual's "self-concept": the fragmentation of the personality is the result of the fragmentation of the community; the person loses his individuality and potential for spontaneity in the role assigned to him in organization. Roszak, on the other hand, views the "alienative dichotomy", to be the result of the rise of the scientific world view. The structural hierarchy takes its toll, but objective consciousness underlies both the structure and its consequences. For Reich the material conditions mould consciousness; for Roszak, a form of consciousness gives rise to certain material conditions.

When it comes to the material consequences of the Corporate State Reich and Roszak begin to diverge greatly. Consequently, each author will be treated separately and consecutively in the analysis and criticism which follows below. The first section deals with Reich's Greening of America, the second section with Roszak's The Making of a Counter Culture.

The Greening of America

Reich is much more willing than Roszak to treat material considerations as important problems in addition to individual problems such as alienation, depersonalization, and anxiety. His book starts with a discussion of the "American Crises" which is composed of material concerns such as poverty, injustice, corruption, distorted priorities, and the decline of democratic participation. His initial explanation of the

rise of Consciousness I and II stresses that consciousness changes in response to changes in the institutions of society and under the impact of technological and organizational developments (see Chapter I, pp. 2-7 above). The willingness to tolerate the losses of privacy, the regimentation and all the other vices of Consciousness II stemmed from the reaction to the vices of unlimited corporate power which evolved in the era of Consciousness I.

Later, Reich seems to forget that the genesis of Consciousness II lay in reactions to the highly arbitrary and selfish policies of big business. He recoils from Consciousness II's search for security and certainty and their propensity to establish lines of authority and responsibility, etc. (see Chapter I, p. 11 above). He seems to forget that the "irrational and random" ways of doing things had left those who were unorganized powerless before the vast resources of the business elite. This inability to remember his insights in the earlier passages of The Greening of America leads Reich to assert later that a highly organized power structure can be dismantled by individuals "doing their own thing". Similarly, Reich offers a competent paraphrase of the arguments against pluralism noting that the individual is powerless in competition with interest groups. The obvious answer would seem to lie with the construction of an institutional framework in which the voices of individuals could be heard: some kind of decentralization of power, industrial democracy, or neighborhood government, etc. Why does

Reich spurn these alternatives?

Part of the answer may stem from his confused portrayal of the U.S. as a totalitarian state. Those who are closest to the struggle with the power structure on issues such as the war in Vietnam seem most apt to lose perspective and denigrate the results of their efforts. Perhaps this is the result of initially underestimating the strength of one's opponent and then becoming demoralized when quick victory is not reached after the first peace march. Perhaps it is due to the sudden exposure to the complexities of inter-related problems which the individual was oblivious to before his politization. Whatever the sources may be, the characterization of the U.S. as a totalitarian state would seem to be a factor which might have caused Reich to disparage traditional political action and to make the claim that political activism is a sure road to Fascism (Chapter I, pp.16-17 above).

Another reason for Reich's disparagement of traditional politics seems to lie in the abandonment of his earlier position on the origins of consciousness. Consciousness I and II, like the consciousness that accompanied medieval times, grew out of the social structure and social artifacts: when it comes to describing Consciousness III, however, Reich claims that it is consciousness which determines the social structure (see Chapter I, p. 17 above). "Action at the level of consciousness", not modifications of institutions or the means of production and distribution, now becomes a

program for social change.

But why does "action at the level of consciousness" turn out to be "doing your own thing"? One must remember that for Reich the New Deal and the efforts at reform by Consciousness II were a failure because in the attempt to solve certain problems (depression, corporate monopoly, etc.) they gave rise to other problems (big government, bureaucracy, a new managerial elite, etc.). The only course of action worth taking, for Reich, is one that solves all problems: i.e., one that introduces the millenium. Since organization and traditional politics failed to deliver "happiness, freedom, and justice for all (under God?)", they do not "work", and therefore, should be abandoned.

Since organization didn't work, one must try disorganization; since rational planning and regulation didn't work, one must not plan and one must be irrational, intuitive, and spontaneous; since science and technology have failed, one must resort to mysticism and primitivism, etc. The only antithesis that is not proposed is that since centralism hasn't worked, one must try decentralization; but alas, one would have to organize in order to decentralize! (Reich's scheme has no formula or framework for balancing possible conflicts between values such as organization and decentralization, happiness and freedom, and the like.) In Consciousness III society, culturally distinct groups co-exist (see Chapter I, p.12 above), never mind how.

Is it any wonder that given this perspective of the

political events of the last century, Reich seizes upon the counter culture (Consciousness III) as a viable alternative? The basis of Consciousness III is "liberation" which means the individual is free to build his own values and life-style from a new beginning (Chapter I, p. 13 above). There is no hierarchy and there are no "losers" in Consciousness III. In addition, Consciousness III believes that thought can be non-linear and that individuals can believe spontaneously without regard for obligations, rights, or duties. In short, Consciousness III embodies the contrary of almost every principle that has "failed" to bring about the new millenium.

Their protest and rebellion, their culture, clothes, music, drugs, ways of thought, and liberated life style are not a passing fad or a form of dissent and refusal, nor are they in any sense irrational. The whole emerging pattern, from ideals to campus demonstrations to beads and bell bottoms to the Woodstock Festival, makes sense and is part of a consistent philosophy. It [the above "consistent philosophy"] is both necessary and inevitable, and in time it will include not only youth, but all people in America.⁴

Although Reich repeatedly refers to the new generation, and freely substitutes the pronoun "it" for the diverse phenomena associated with the counter culture, it should be noted that the only basis for lumping together groups as diverse as the Hell's Angels, the Hare Krishna, and some college students is that they are a loose coalition who reject some of the values, beliefs, customs and norms of American society. This diversity in the counter culture, which includes elements notorious for their intolerance, does

not bode well as a base upon which to build a society based upon tolerance and co-existence. The heterogeneity of the counter culture is a matter about which Reich has not reflected sufficiently. This is evident from the fact that his definition of politics as diversity (Chapter I, p. 12 above) is contradicted as soon as he takes up the question of the basis for the Consciousness III community: "The basis of a Consciousness III community must be agreement on major values". How this agreement might be reached between diverse elements without any common ideological commitment or institutional framework, is never confronted by Reich.

Perhaps the communities he is speaking about are small enough to resolve all conflicts between individuals through non-institutional ways. But this leaves unanswered the very real problem of the reconciliation of inter-community disputes. This problem is double-edged: when communities interact, common bonds arise; but the opportunity for friction also increases, which, in turn, necessitates greater institutional procedures, if conflict is to be avoided. If, however, a community seeks maximum isolation they run the dangers of losing the common bonds which assure one's tribe or village allies in time of need.

Reich has not paid enough attention to the problem of reconciling his extreme individual liberatarianism with the basic needs which must be fulfilled if society is to survive. If the "feeling" disappears, who takes care of the children? Reich shows little sensitivity to the needs of those who may

not be able to fend for themselves in a world of no obligations, duties, or rights. Is an individual blameless if the ill or insane perish because taking care of them wasn't anybody's "thing" that day?

Reich states that others must be accepted as they are, but must a tolerant society indulge the authentic fascist who puts forth his "true self", his "integrated personality" for others to respond to? Or, is the diversity that Reich speaks of limited only to superficial matters such as bell bottoms, the length of one's hair, or whether or not one wears a bra? This diversity is already tolerated in Consciousness II society by a great number of institutions. One suspects that this is the level upon which Reich is operating, from the passages in The Greening of America relating how being an elevator operator can be a "liberated" job after conversion to Consciousness III (see Reich, The Greening of America, p. 403).

Despite the shortcomings of the counter culture as a foundation for a new society, Reich views them as the only revolutionary agents of change in the U.S. today. This revolutionary force is a rather unusual one to be sure, especially considering that they remain a revolutionary force by doing their own thing, whatever that might be.

Opting-out of the system is the vehicle for change; but Reich never informs his readers as to how far they must "opt-out" of the system in order to guarantee its downfall ("Are my sideburns enough?", asked the used-car salesman). Econo-

mist Henry C. Wallich informs us that youth can opt-out pretty far without endangering the system:

But when people start consuming less and enjoying it more,... they may decide to work less. Then, we shall get the four-or-three day week.... For most of us, there aren't enough days to get through the week's chores. But today's young people may feel differently. If they do, they can go ahead assured that the economy can adapt to a new life-style.⁵

Wallich also assures us that what youth has done is to change the styles -- the goods are more colorful -- they have not stopped consuming.

The source of the "American Crises", which consists of a number of material problems (Chapter I, footnote 9, above) as well as the aforementioned psychological problems, lies in the inability of the Consciousness II group to "understand" the system correctly:

...we no longer understand the system under which we live, hence the structure has become obsolete and we have become powerless; in turn, the system has been permitted to assume unchallenged power to dominate our lives, and now rumbles along, unguided and therefore indifferent to human ends.⁶

In order to facilitate analysis it may be useful to list the premises and conclusions associated with the statement above.

- (1) What we do not understand we cannot control.
- (2) We live "under" a system.
- (3) We do not understand the system.
- (4) No one else understands and controls the system.
(An implicit assumption.)

(a) We are powerless.

(b) The system is obsolete.

- (c) The system dominates us.
- (d) The system is unguided.
- (e) The system is indifferent to human needs.

Premise (4) is necessary in addition to (1) and (3) in order to come to conclusion (d). However, is premise (4) true? Although technology and organization form the basis for all industrial societies, corporations in capitalist economies use the findings of technological and organizational research to maximize profit and minimize costs. Since the decision to adopt new technological developments is made by management, they are responsible for its associated vices; and, since profit is the overriding consideration weighed by corporate decision-makers, it is no wonder that their interests and those of the corporations, take priority over the public interest. The important point is that the economic sector is linked to technology and organization and that Reich is misleading his readers when he says

These factors technology and organization have a powerful momentum of their own that may not be inconsistent with class interests, but may well be indifferent to them.⁷

Premise (4) is false, consequently, conclusion (d) is also false.

Reich uses the term "control" to speak about the ability to affect the social structure. It is much more useful to speak about degrees of influence or variations in access to power in the political and social realms. A corporation executive might have a virtual monopoly of power within an

organization so that it would be appropriate to speak of his "control" of the organization. In another realm, such as in the distribution of defense contracts, he may have more or less influence upon those who exercise power, or he may share power with others. Premise (1) is surely false if we are supposed to believe that it is impossible to effect something which is not understood. Reich combines premises (1) and (3) and concludes that we are "powerless" (conclusion (a)), but if "understanding" is accessible then it is misleading to speak of powerlessness. By dichotomizing "control" and "powerlessness" Reich accepts the sense of powerlessness that an individual might feel at face value, and ignores the potential power and influence which many such individuals could exert if they were organized around an issue or program.

Conclusion (c) seems to be the equivalent of, or merely a restatement of, premise (2). It is difficult to believe that someone could offer us this kind of a vague metaphorical image akin to "the machine run amok", this "system as bogey man" imagery, in place of something like analysis and explanation. Perhaps Reich avoids a sociological, psychological, economic, or political explanation for social problems because he feels that the public is at least partially to blame for the persistence of an economic system based upon wasteful consumption, because, after all, they keep buying those goods.

If it were true that one could not effect change in a system unless we understood the system then "understanding" would surely be a necessary, but not sufficient condition

for effecting change. It is necessary, after all, to do something based upon one's knowledge. Reich ignores this time-worn observation with his notion of revolution by "consciousness".

Reich's view of the dynamics of revolution completely omits any analysis of the social structure in terms of the patterns of power, wealth, and privilege. In this he ignores the findings of the seminal thinkers on revolution presented in Chapter III above, who universally stressed the interaction between the objective social, political, and economic structures, the individual's perception of that structure, and his evaluation of his place in it. Reich ignores the question of the possible confrontations, both within the counter culture and between the counter culture and the prevailing order: what is the likelihood of success for the movement? There is no attempt at an answer to this question, much less one based upon any examination of the resources and skills at the counter culture's disposal; neither is there an analysis of the power and resources available to the "establishment". Neither Reich nor Roszak makes any attempt to assess the counter culture's depth of commitment to their alternative values, or to empirically establish what those values are and how uniformly they are held; nor do they adequately define the counter culture or even examine its strength in numbers alone.

The likelihood of Consciousness III spreading to a majority of the population, or even to a majority of youth,

may seem highly probable to Reich, ensconced in the cafeteria at Yale where much of The Greening of America was written, but to a number of observers who have witnessed the counter culture first-hand, there is the spectre of a lonelier, and more anguished side to the counter culture than Reich or Roszak seem to have thought possible. Many of the individuals in the counter culture are as alienated and disillusioned as Reich and Roszak depict them; but in the absence of an alternative community, great numbers of these individuals drift from place to place in isolation which is far removed from the picture of the counter culture as Reich and Roszak portray it. Many in the counter culture seem to have severed all bonds with the rest and have embarked upon a grim journey -- moving from one "scene" to another in search of a set of relationships which will unify their personality.

The contention that nothing stands in the way of a massive move to the counter culture by white and blue collar workers becomes absurd until Reich demonstrates that some alternate means of fulfilling the basic needs for food, shelter and clothing is available to them.

Reich asserts that the low status worker suffers from an inferiority complex and frustration (Chapter I, p. 19 above). This, in conjunction with Durkheim's findings that change alone, with its concomitant uncertainties, can be the cause of anomie, should strongly warn the reader of the possibilities for authoritarianism implicit in a climate of uncertainty and despair.

The Making of a Counter Culture

Roszak's use of symbolism, metaphor, allegory, and simile presents special problems to the social science critic who does not wish to confine his comments to literary style. Roszak writes well, and his fluid style and authoritative tone mixed with all the academic trappings such as footnotes and appendices is apt to lull even a careful reader into uncritically accepting the connotative meanings of many sentences which later, in the context of a passage or section, are used to sustain what appear to be the most outrageous assertions. One is faced with a dilemma: should I nitpick over the meaning of every term? (some of which seem deliberately chosen for their penumbra of connotative meaning) or should I be content with a subjective interpretation drawn from the context?

Has the author revealed anything about the technocracy when he likens it to a "capacious sponge able to soak up prodigious quantities of discontent...."? It is more likely that he has informed you about his feelings vis a vis the technocracy. "By the technocracy, I mean that social form in which an industrial society reaches the peak of its organizational integration...." What is a "social form"? What are the indicators of "organizational integration"? How does one measure organizational integration so that it would be possible to know when it was at its peak? What is an "unquestionable imperative"? One could go on for pages and pages with examples which match the above, and some which put them

to shame.

In his "explanation" of the connection between totalitarian control and science (Chapter II, pp. 37-8 above) Roszak goes through an elaborate series of steps:

- (1) In the technocracy experts dominate because they know (reliably) about that which is relevant to our survival and happiness.
- (2) What is "reliable" knowledge? Answer: it is knowledge that is "scientifically sound".
- (3) Scientifically sound knowledge is characterized by "objectivity".
- (4) Objectivity consists of observing things without¹/₂ any purely personal considerations.

...that at last is how we define the expert: he is one who really knows what is what, because he cultivates an objective consciousness (see Chapter II, p. 38 above).

Without going into the question of how one could be said to have knowledge at all if it were "unreliable", one can say without any doubt that since neither "objective consciousness" nor "cultivates" appears in premises (1) to (4) that there are no grounds for their inclusion in the conclusion. Roszak moves from a fairly non-descript statement (except for the appearance of "reliably") about the reason for experts being in power, to a complete non sequiteaur in the conclusion concerning the definition of an expert. And, needless to say, there is no attempt to operationally define the terms (although someone operationally defining "objectivity" might

be fun to watch).

Another example of the problems Roszak presents concerns his belief that the objective consciousness leads to a culture marked by the alienative dichotomy, the invidious hierarchy, and the mechanistic imperative. The alienative dichotomy consists in dividing reality into two spheres; the "In-Here" as "...that place within the person to which consciousness withdraws when one wants to know without becoming involved in or committed to that which is being known". There is no way whatever of communicating in an intersubjective manner what is meant by "consciousness withdrawing". Roszak displays his own "estrangement" from reality by speaking of the "In-Here" as if it were a place inside of him to which he could withdraw. One can envision a little man inside Roszak's head; peering out at the world through his eyes -- an invisible shield between him and that which is "being known". The term "being known" conjures up visions of turning over a dead animal and finding maggots underneath. Again, we are subjected to the imaginary impressions which Roszak has of those whom he regards as the unliberated dupes of the technocracy: he refers to their identities as "...contracted into a small, hard ball;... something which is less than it otherwise might be" (Chapter II, p. 40 above). Roszak doesn't bother asking the individual himself about the scope and dimensions of his existence -- he assumes that those who are not in the counter culture are miserable, self-seeking wretches, completely devoid of compassion, sensitivity,

and moral scruples.

The ad hominem strategy is amply evidenced by the two references to the scientist's way of looking at others: Roszak doesn't call the scientists racists or Nazis; he merely asserts that their way of interaction with the world is analogous to the racist's, and that "at the extreme", the scientist's alienated relationship is that of the Nazi experimenter -- not a difference in kind, but a difference in degree (see Chapter II, p. 41 above).

Roszak's fast and loose play with the English language so permeates the entirety of The Making of a Counter Culture that an exhaustive account would serve no useful purpose. It is sufficient to note the several points at which the mis-use of terms or the absence of an argument is crucial to the overall theme of the work. Especially misleading portions include Roszak's discussion of the mechanistic imperative, the relationship between ethics and science, and the "great man".

The "In-Here", in its alleged search for total objectivity, presumably seeks to realize in machines what it can't achieve in itself. The problems, as Reich perceives the situation, are "redefined" so that they are quantitative and can be handled by the machines. Roszak's imagination takes flight here again: problems are not concepts: people have problems, and these problems cannot be defined away. The leaky sewer, the garbage-strewn lot, the unguarded crosswalk, and the child with rickets are all somebody's problem.

No amount of redefinition can pick up the garbage, repair the sewer, or provide the child with vitamin D. Insofar as I have heard, Roszak is the first person to claim that problems are solved by "quantification".

Roszak's condemnation of science seems to be based upon the method of activity which that enterprise entails rather than upon the consequences of any of the research. There is no attempt to distinguish between those persons working upon such things as hybrid varieties of grains to aid in feeding more of the world's starving millions, and those engaged in biochemical warfare research. In another ad hominem attack, Roszak likens the entire scientific community to a community of certified lunatics; by analogy, of course (see Chapter II, p. 45 above). This kind of ploy, i.e., choosing from among distasteful examples (one of which dates back 97 years) to illustrate the negative aspects of science, while never mentioning a single positive accomplishment in that field seems to be a tasteless exercise in propaganda.

In a further attempt to discredit the field of science, Roszak cites a quotation by P.B. Medawar (Chapter II, p. 47 above) and in the process either misunderstands or deliberately misconstrues the meaning of that statement. When Medawar states that Behaviourism as a methodology "...taught psychology with brutal emphasis that 'the dog is whining' and 'the dog is sad' are statements of altogether different empirical standing...." Roszak concentrates upon the words "sad", "whining", and "brutal" to the exclusion of everything

else, except, perhaps, the term "behaviourism". He retorts self-righteously "Professor Medawar does not make clear... on whom the 'brutal emphasis' of this distinction has fallen: the experimenter or the... subject" (Chapter II, p. 47 above). What Roszak doesn't seem to notice is that one could freely substitute the word "smiling" for "whining", and the word "happy" for "sad" without changing the meaning of the statement at all. Roszak implies, of course, that acknowledging the difference in empirical standing between the two statements is a sign of callousness and lack of feeling on the part of the speaker. This is an unwarranted assumption.

Although an objective consciousness does not seem to have impaired Roszak's abilities for ethical criticism of the technocracy and its agents, he makes the statement that the technocracy has no well-defined values with which to discriminate between desirable and undesirable activities. There seem to be several interrelated reasons for this. One reason is that scientific skepticism has undermined traditional religious thought. The concepts "sacred" and "sacrosanct" have been expunged from usage and with them went any chance to deny the scientist's "right to know" (see Chapter II, p. 45 above). Roszak then states "...there exists no way whatever, on strictly scientific grounds, to invalidate any objective quest for knowledge,...." This is not unusual, there never has been a way to invalidate (if Roszak is using "invalidate" as one would use "condemn" or to "censure") any

activity whatsoever from a scientific point of view; science is not ethics. Apparently, the moral admonitions of individuals and groups appears worthless to Roszak, for he feels the need for an ethical discipline that the technocracy would impose on itself "...by reference to a pre-established moral and,...." (Chapter II, pp. 45-6 above). The real question, about who would pre-establish the ends, is never pursued by Roszak.

The suggestion which is central to The Making of a Counter Culture is that men subordinate the question "how shall we know"? to the question "how shall we live"? For some, notably Plato and Socrates, the two questions came to the same thing. For others, perhaps, the need to subordinate either question to the other will seem pointless; why should one aspect of the human existence, either passion or intellect be subordinated to the other? Roszak will not concede that scientific knowledge and the transcendent experience can co-exist; either in the same individual or the same society. One cannot answer this question until some intersubjective definition of "visionary experience" or "transcendent experience" is put forth. Until that time it is likely that Roszak will brush aside those who claim to have bridged both worlds much as he did Einstein, Max Born, and Keynes: by alluding to T.S. Eliot's Confidential Clerk. But, that one is reminded of a disparaging play does not discredit the claims of these men, nor does it establish the necessity for such a purified existence as Roszak would demand.

Footnotes - Chapter IV

¹ "Conservative Libertarian", Time, March 8, 1971, pp. 42-43.

² "Overruling Mitchell", Time, April 19, 1971, pp. 52-53.

³ Alasdair MacIntyre, Marcuse (London: Wm. Collins and Company and Fontana, 1970), pp. 68-69.

⁴ Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 2.

⁵ Henry C. Wallich, "Consuming Youth", Newsweek, March 24, 1971, p. 75.

⁶ Reich, op. cit., p. 13.

⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

CHAPTER V

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This concluding chapter recommends an avenue of research which is precluded by the mode of analysis to which I have restricted myself in the present work. A discussion of some definitional preliminaries is included here, followed by an attempt to anticipate the probable findings of the suggested research.

Thus far, I have devoted my attention to the following four considerations: 1) an analysis of The Greening of America and The Making of a Counter Culture--chiefly a task of clarification and exposition; 2) a critique of the "revolution by consciousness" thesis based upon the work of eminent thinkers on revolution and social change; 3) a demonstration of the invalidity of some of Reich and Roszak's major arguments and the exposure of contradictions between significant elements within their respective works; 4) criticism of Reich and Roszak's misuse of terms; especially when the misused terms become misleading in the context in which they are presented and when crucial conclusions depend upon these terminological abuses.

In the preceding chapters, Reich and Roszak's characterizations of the counter culture have been accepted at face-value for the purposes of analysis and criticism. The intention has been to evaluate the two most prominent expositions of the thesis that the counter culture represents a

revolutionary social movement, not to examine the counter culture itself. The comprehensive empirical research which would be necessary in order to independently validate the many assertions that Reich and Roszak make about the counter culture is beyond the scope of the present enquiry.

Although this exegesis finds The Greening of America and The Making of a Counter Culture wanting on logical grounds, it does not speak to the empirical claims about the counter culture set forth in these two works. Even if Reich and Roszak are mistaken in their assessment of the revolutionary potential of the counter culture, the existence of a social movement with the characteristics described by these authors might constitute a phenomenon well worth independent investigation by the social scientist.

A social movement such as the counter culture reflects the dissatisfactions that its members have with the prevailing social order. In addition, the beliefs, values, and aspirations of a sub-culture are a potential basis for the emergence of new self-conceptions and ways of thinking about accepted modes of existence. These, in turn, give rise to new hopes and demands which may, at some future date, provide the motivation for concerted action toward the realization of specific goals.¹ Whether or not the counter culture actually exists as Reich and Roszak portray it, is, of course, an empirical question; and one which cannot be pursued here. However, attention will be drawn to findings which are at variance with Reich and Roszak's characteriza-

tions of the counter culture, and which seem to indicate that their portrayal of that movement is incomplete and misleadingly optimistic.

It should be noted that to empirically validate Reich and Roszak's claims about the behaviour, beliefs, aspirations, and values of the counter culture, or even to assess its numerical strength, requires a prior task of definition. Reich and Roszak do not present a coherent set of defining characteristics with which it would be possible to differentiate between counter culture individuals and the general population. The reader is left to formulate his own impression of the counter culture from passages which are often imprecise and inconsistent. In the following passages I will set out what I feel to be some major short-comings of Reich and Roszak's concepts "Consciousness III" and "counter culture" for further empirical research.

An example of the imprecision with which the two foregoing concepts are used can be drawn from the numerous passages which suggest that long hair, bell bottom trousers, beads, the use of drugs, and other such traits identify the counter culture individual.² Similarly, one is led to believe that an overriding characteristic of counter culture members is their rejection of the "myth of objective consciousness"-- that Consciousness III individuals cannot share the scientific world-view which is said to permeate North American society.³

The problem with the imprecise definitions above is

one which is shared by broad definitions in general: if a wide definitional net is cast, the catch is often more, and at the same time less, than is desired or anticipated. What such definitions net in quantity (through their inclusiveness) they may lose in quality (through insufficient discriminatory power.) Stipulations about apparel, drug-use, and world-views, such as those set out by Reich and Roszak, may be easily met by groups such as the Hell's Angels and Satan's Disciples, both "outlaw" motorcycle gangs.

The inclusion of motorcycle gangs and similar elements in the "counter culture" would seem to cast into question the obvious desirability of the movement as an alternative to the prevailing society. Roszak anticipates this problem and attempts to deal with it directly:

...there are manifestations around the fringe of the counter culture that one cannot but regard as worryingly unhealthy. Elements of pornographic grotesquery and bloodcurdling sadomasochism emerge again and again in the art and theater of our youth culture and intrude themselves constantly into the underground press.⁴

Roszak fails to satisfactorily explain what it means to say that these unhealthy manifestations are confined to a "fringe" of the counter culture.

Does a small minority within the counter culture possess sadomasochistic tendencies, or are these proclivities marginally distributed throughout the entire group? Roszak seems to endorse the former view when he states that "'Make Love Not War' is still the banner most of the dissenting young are rallying to,..."⁵ However, if grotesque and fright-

ening elements pervade the counter culture media and other vehicles of expression, upon what grounds can we assume that this material appears solely for consumption by a small minority, or that this material reflects the tastes of those who shape the underground media? Although Roszak does not devote enough energy to resolving questions such as these, he seems acutely aware of what he terms "the fraudulence and folly"⁶ of the counter culture. Essentially, Roszak's book constitutes an appeal to the radicals of the "older generation" to help build a mature and sophisticated framework of thought atop the instincts which the young bring to their dissent; he views the work of Marcuse, Brown, Watts, and Goodman as contributing to this end.

Roszak acknowledges that there may be undesirable elements within the counter culture, but bases his support of the movement upon what he feels to be the much greater undesirability of the present social order as well as upon his belief that the good values and instincts of the counter culture will take precedence over their bad tendencies in any foreseeable context. Reich, however, never gives any indication that he is aware of the possibility of problematic elements within the counter culture.

An essential aspect of Reich's concept "Consciousness III" is a change in behaviour and dress. However, Reich asserts that this change will be accompanied by a rejection of certain goals, values, and expectations of the prevailing society.⁷ For instance, members of "Consciousness III",

according to Reich, reject the concept of excellence and the notion that there are intersubjective standards for making evaluations.⁸ The absence of such standards for evaluation makes comparisons between individuals impossible, and therefore, notes Reich, "Consciousness III" individuals cannot judge others or compete against others.

Because there are no governing standards, no one is rejected. Everyone is entitled to pride in himself, and no one should act in a way that is servile, or feel inferior, or allow himself to be treated as if he were inferior.⁹ (*Italics mine.*)

It is difficult to establish whether Reich is making empirical claims, moral recommendations, or if, on the other hand, he is stipulating conditions for the correct use of his term "Consciousness III."¹⁰

If we use Reich's descriptive indicators, such as styles of dress and hair length, to identify members of the counter culture, then whether or not these individuals reject the concepts of excellence and competition, and whether or not these individuals judge or compete with others is an empirical question. On the other hand, if both descriptive indicators, such as dress and drug-use, etc., and attributes such as non-competition and value-relativism (as understood by Reich) are stipulated as defining characteristics of the counter culture, then to say that there is no competitive ethos in the counter culture and that counter culture individuals reject the concept of excellence is tautological and not terribly interesting. There may or may not exist individuals who can actually meet these definitional re-

quirements--a possibility which is evidenced by Reich's revelation that in "describing" Consciousness III "...we shall be talking about an idealized consciousness, and not about something that is to be seen in all aspects in any one person."¹¹

Although it may be the case that no person exhibits all the definitional characteristics of Reich's idealized Consciousness III, it should not be concluded that this necessarily calls into question the existence of Consciousness III as a social movement. What Reich has done is to implicitly put forth two "Consciousness III's": an ideal-type (C_i), and an existing group (C_e) which is identifiable by means of the intuitive and inclusive definitions outlined above. In his discussion of Consciousness III, Reich indiscriminantly mixes descriptions of C_e with C_i , his ideal-type. An explicit exposition of this implicit dichotomization of Consciousness III would present Reich with the problem of explaining the relationship between C_e and C_i .

Roszak vacillates between presenting the counter culture as an imminent threat to the established order in his chapter "An Invasion of Centaurs,"¹² and a more modest appraisal of the counter culture as fertile ground for a revolution based upon, and made possible by, the mature guidance of older radicals. Thus, he too seems to present an existing yet unsatisfactory counter culture (C_e), and an ideal, but perhaps nonexistent "counter culture" (C_i) which is developed through his discussion of Goodman, Ginsberg, and

others.¹³

Reich holds up the existing Consciousness III group (C_e) as a model for Consciousness II--the "revolution" taking place as more and more people abandon the "old culture"¹⁴ and join the counter culture. By disclosing the hidden gap between C_e and C_i we confront Reich with two questions: 1) how does C_e progress toward the realization of C_i ? and 2) on what grounds does Reich call the move away from the prevailing culture "revolutionary?" Would it be more appropriate to reserve the term "revolution" to denote the cumulative move from the existing social order, through C_e , to C_i ? After all, the move away from the prevailing culture to the counter culture (C_e) is primarily a process of rejecting the institutions and values of the society one is born into: it is "...an attempt to live as if the Corporate State did not exist and some new form of community was already here."¹⁵ Thus, moving away from this posture of alienation (C_e) to the establishment of a viable alternative community, capable of supporting a C_i life-style, would seem to be a more difficult and more "revolutionary" task than the initial act of rejecting the prevailing values and institutions of the extant society.

It should be obvious that an independent enquiry designed to investigate Reich and Roszak's claims about the counter culture would have to avoid the pitfalls of the C_e -- C_i dichotomy. In addition, it would seem that a definition of the "counter culture" less normatively laden than that

general phenomenon associated with the term "counter culture". This broad concept "counter culture" might be defined in terms of easily recognizable characteristics, and could include, perhaps, all those professing to be members of the "counter culture."

After the initial identification of the field of interest, based upon the broad definition above, further distinctions could be made within the population on the basis of subsequent findings concerning differences in values, beliefs, personality traits, and behaviour patterns, to mention only a few possibilities. By classifying the population in terms of different criteria, the researcher could analyze the structure of the counter culture and make an assessment of the possible significance of similarities and differences among various sub-groups. This approach would seem to have far greater potential for research than the one taken by Reich and Roszak, whose normatively laden definitions of the "counter culture" ($C_e + C_i$) preclude the possibility of negative findings a priori.

Throughout The Greening of America Reich mixes the characteristics of his ideal-type version of Consciousness III with many of the widely acknowledged and easily recognizable attributes of the counter culture. Roszak, in The Making of a Counter Culture, implicitly combines his recommendations of certain values, world-views, and behaviour patterns with claims about the existing counter culture by treating the counter culture through the works of Goodman, Ginsberg, Mar-

cuse, Leary, and others. This undifferentiated mixture of what we have termed C_e with C_i may be responsible for the conflict between the impression one draws from Reich and Roszak's portrayal of the counter culture and impressions of the counter culture drawn from other sources, including personal experience.

The portrait of the counter culture painted by Reich and Roszak is one of an idyllic community; a society without losers, made up of happy individuals whose personalities correspond to the model outlined under the rubric "recovery of self"--an "integrated" personality which is unattainable within the confines of the "Corporate State" or the "technocracy."¹⁶

...today those students who are already into the new culture welcome everyone else with warmth and affection; there is room for all, there are no secrets, there is no initiation, there is no competition. It is as if, in the old college days, the whole football team had come knocking at the scrawny freshman's door, saying "join us," "we're your friends," "come to our parties," ... "we think you're a great man, we respect you and love you."¹⁷

The counter culture is portrayed as providing opportunities to express one's individuality through cooperation, equality and fraternity: "...the world is a community. People all belong to the same family....There are no 'tough guys' among the youth of Consciousness III."¹⁸ Feelings of inferiority, the need to conform, and the "meaninglessness" of Consciousness II are left behind by the counter culture: "One must live completely at each moment,...with the utter wholeness that Heidegger expresses."¹⁹

Although the material presented below should not be construed as a substitute for the comprehensive empirical research

suggested above, it does offer some insights into the counter culture based upon the experiences of journalists and scholars, and includes material from my own field research undertaken in preparation for this thesis. These findings indicate that the search for meaningful modes of existence outside the established order may be accompanied by a degree of loneliness, struggle, and despair unrevealed in Reich and Roszak's idyllic portrait of the counter culture.

Peter Marin characterizes this search for alternative modes of existence as a "void"; "...a terrifying sense in the young of disconnection, impotence, sorrow and rage that exceeds anything one finds elsewhere in the world."²⁰ "The problem," he continues,

is that the dissolution of culture both releases and betrays us. It gives us the space to create new styles, new gods, and connections, but it denies us the strengths and talents to do it: for these are learned in relationships and community, and the dissolution of culture deprives us of them.²¹

Other facets of the counter culture which seem inadequately dealt with by Reich and Roszak include the widespread exploitation of women by counter culture men, the vulnerability of the counter culture in the face of adversity, and the controversial question of drug-use within the counter culture.²²

Although Roszak is well aware of the degree to which drug-use pervades the counter culture, he makes no attempt to investigate the role that the "psychedelics" might play in "...the reformulation of the personality, upon which social

ideology and culture are ultimately based."²³ Instead, he seizes upon the notion that Timothy Leary is responsible for the counter culture's fascination with drugs, particularly LSD.²⁴

Neither Reich nor Roszak attempts to investigate the possible functions that the elaborate rituals surrounding the production, distribution, storage, and consumption of drugs might serve within the counter culture. It might be the case, for instance, that the illegality of drugs, with the resulting need for secrecy and trust among fellow users, makes them an important agent in the foundation of group-cohesiveness within the counter culture. Drugs would seem to provide a basis upon which to make we-they distinctions between those who use them and those who do not.

It might be the case that a complementary relationship exists between the counter culture's conception of themselves as "outsiders" and the "establishment's" reinforcement of that view through the vigorous enforcement of laws restricting drug-use. Also, an affinity would seem to exist between the effects of certain drugs and the counter culture's quest for immediate, intense, and non-intellective experiences. The possible significance of these and other aspects of drug-use by the counter culture are never explored in The Greening of America and The Making of a Counter Culture.

Unlike Roszak, who at least mentions the topic of drug abuse (although his treatment of the subject seems inadequate by virtue of its superficiality), Reich all but ignores the

subject. There is no mention of the physiological damage that amphetamines ("speed") have caused the young, nor is there any discussion of the unsavory experiences which generated counter culture terms such as "freak-out" and "bummer." A reporter for the Village Voice writes:

Haight-Ashbury was no Eden by the middle of June. It was a rough scene for a kid from the suburbs. It was a sudden and harsh initiation into a strange underworld of lovers and burners, of sensation and violence, lined with acid and laced with speed..."There was nothing bigger than they were," a Haight-Ashbury veteran said. "They had only their own trips."²⁵

Reich treats the whole issue of drugs as if it were obviously peripheral and unimportant, although, if drug-use in the counter culture is as pervasive as it seems, it is difficult to imagine how such a drug society, premised on the rejection of logic and the intellect,²⁶ could support the technological apparatus which Reich believes is necessary if Consciousness III is to survive and supercede the present social order.²⁷

The extent to which Reich and Roszak may have underestimated the undesirable effects which drug-use has had upon individual counter culture members is noteworthy and regrettable in itself. However, in addition to ignoring the physiological and psychological casualties of drug abuse, Reich and Roszak do not seem to be aware of a number of other aspects of the counter culture which are at variance with their views. One aspect which is important to the "revolution by consciousness thesis" is the apparent falsity of Reich's assertion "...there is nobody whatever on the other side."²⁸ We shall examine some of the accounts which demon-

strate the existence of widespread opposition to the counter culture and which document notable uses of force in making that opposition felt. A related topic which remains untreated by Reich and Roszak is the change which opposition and conflict has effected in the character and mood within the counter culture. This chapter concludes with a discussion of a number of developments within the counter culture, including the move to rural communes, the turn toward Pentecostal religions, and the "politization" of some elements of the counter culture; developments which might be the result, in part, of a change in mood within the counter culture.

There are a number of aspects of the counter culture which would seem potentially offensive and annoying to adherents of the traditional values and mores of society, and which might serve as the basis for antagonistic feelings toward the counter culture. For example, the very appearance of "hippies" might arouse distrust and resentment in those who are raised in the belief that "cleanliness is next to Godliness." In addition, counter culture individuals appear to be completely unproductive. This unproductivity may anger those who are burdened with debts or who have struggled to extricate themselves from poverty, and, who feel that the counter culture is basically parasitic. Others may resent the counter cultural propensity to seek immediate gratification and the apparent inability of counter culture individuals to defer pleasures for the sake of long-range goals.

In addition to the general characteristics listed above,

there are specific attributes of the counter culture which appear to be potentially volatile given the existence of frustrated or sexually repressed elements in the general population. These attributes include such things as sexual promiscuity, immodest dress, public displays of intimacy or "erotic" behaviour, and, perhaps, the use of "offensive" language, particularly by women.

The discussion above has not been presented in order to account for or "explain" the violence which has been directed toward the counter culture. However, the counter culture's pervading aura of sexuality, drug-use, and "disobedience" offers itself as a likely candidate when one attempts to form speculative hypotheses concerning the motivation underlying the persecution and harassment which we outline below. The following examples of official harassment of the counter culture do not constitute an exhaustive treatment of the subject, but are offered in contrast to Reich and Roszak's ingenious presentations.

As early as Memorial Day, 1967, police assaulted Tompkins Square Park -- a gathering place for the early "flower children" in New York's Lower East Side.²⁹ In April, 1968, the "Yip-in" in Grand Central Station was turned into a free-swinging melee by the members of the Tactical Patrol Force. All exits from the area were blocked and then "flying wedges" of baton-wielding police were repeatedly thrown into the crowd. A reporter from the Village Voice, who received five stitches after police allegedly struck his head

against closed plate-glass doors, compared the incident to "...a fire in a theatre."³⁰

Other techniques which have been used to threaten and intimidate members of the counter culture include the "street sweeps" in San Francisco, Berkeley, and New York, where club-wielding policemen scattered people, beating some and arresting others after sealing off all exits from the assaulted areas.³¹ Harassment of the counter culture on a mass scale has also included illegal drug-raids and apartment-smashing raids by officials on the pretext of enforcing housing and health codes.³² In addition to the official harassment, muggers, rapists and thieves find that they can assault members of the counter culture with relative impunity--the victims receive "...insults from the police when rapes or robberies are reported...."³³

In the face of this overt harassment, and in view of the increasingly inhospitable atmosphere of the urban centers in general, the ethos of the counter culture seems to have rapidly changed from innocent optimism to ardent pessimism.

When people are attacked as a group, they change....the organization and expression of their collective life will be transformed. When members of a gathering believe that there is a grave danger imminent and that opportunities for escape are rapidly diminishing, the group loses its organizational quality.³⁴

It is my impression that a number of factors conspired to sap the energy of the counter culture in a comparatively short time; perhaps in as little as two years.³⁵ The failure of the San Francisco "summer of love" and the devastation to the

Haight-Ashbury community in the wake of the influx of young people was the first set-back.

Following the concentrated coverage of the first "Be-in" by the news media and the press, preparations were made for the arrival of an estimated 500,000 "hippies" during the summer of 1967.³⁶ A group calling themselves "Diggers"³⁷ opened a number of "free stores", distributed food in Golden Gate Park, and attempted to gain camping privileges for the new young people as they began to arrive. However, city officials refused permission to camp in the park, largely upon the grounds that this would constitute a health hazard in the absence of any sanitary facilities.

The Diggers then began arranging for temporary sleeping space with local residents of the community so that people could at least find shelter during the nights. Soon it became necessary to mobilize a clinic to cope with venereal disease, hepatitis, and the victims of the ill-effects of drugs. The increase in narcotics arrests and prosecutions arising from the search for runaway minors soon necessitated a legal aid service. Both of these services were provided by concerned doctors and lawyers who received no aid from the civil authorities.

It did not take long for the Haight-Ashbury to become a political issue on a number of grounds: narcotics, morals, truancy, runaway minors, health codes, robbery, murder, and rape. There were rumours concerning the activities of the Mafia in the distribution and sale of drugs--a number of

indigenous drug dealers were reputed to have been murdered in the process of a Mafia takeover of the Haight-Ashbury market. These factors, together with the growing list of casualties from an influx of impure drugs (adulterated with substances ranging from strychnine and "speed" to "Drano") marked a turning point in the mood and outlook in the Haight-Ashbury community.

And, as if the internal problems of the new community were not enough, apocalyptic rumours sprung up,...that "the Haight is going to be burned to the ground" along with the adjoining Fillmore Negro ghetto. There followed a series of ugly street incidents between blacks and whites--assaults, sexual attacks, window smashings--which papably heightened racial tensions and fed the credibility of the rumours.³⁸

The failure of the incoming youths to find "happiness, love, and freedom," the frenetic "survival of the fittest" ethic which emerged out of the environment of scarcity, the switch to Methedrine by large numbers of street people, and the growing policy of harassment and repression by the Mayor, chief of Police, and members of the Board of Supervisors³⁹ all led to the emergence of a more pessimistic ethos in the Haight-Ashbury wing of the counter culture.

As more and more people became disillusioned with Haight-Ashbury, three major alternatives were resorted to by those who would or could not reconvert to the values and mores of the prevailing North American society: 1) refuge on a rural commune; 2) conversion to a religious sect; or 3) a more political stance. Peter Marin, Visiting Fellow at

the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, writes:

The flower children I know have been driven to exile or heroin, or else they now arm themselves with guns instead of flowers. The first wave of exhilaration is over, and the young have moved on to something lonelier and far more real, a kind of mythic struggle in the darkness more profound than any Reich recognizes or has chosen to enter.⁴⁰

Marin views Woodstock as the end of an era--the mood and state of mind of the counter culture has since assumed the ethos of Altamont and Kent State. He notes that "...Hendrix and Joplin [are] dead from drugs, and everywhere [there is] a new mood, a new grimness."⁴¹

Many of those who left the urban centers in the face of the repressive measures taken by the civil authorities have attempted to regroup and recapture the optimistic spirit of the early counter culture on rural communes. However, the rural authorities have proven to be even less hospitable to the movement than their urban counterparts.⁴² In addition, local ranchers have found the hippy communitarian's free-roaming dogs to be a menace to their livestock, and, in Big Sur, counter culture communes have dumped raw sewage into rivers from which their non-Consciousness III neighbours must draw water for personal use.⁴³

Hedgepeth and Stock, in their photo-essay of communal life in the counter culture titled The Alternative,⁴⁴ indicate that communal experiments are moving away from Reich's characterization of the counter culture as a revolutionary movement predicated upon the cornucopia provided by technology. They portray the counter culture

as a "regenerative" movement "...every bit as demon-filled and apocalyptic as the Old Testament...." The communal counter culture is based upon three major premises:

That (1) Somewhere along the evolutionary line civilization slipped up, freaked out and grew into a self-consuming, arthritic gargoyle; that (2) We've got to get "back to the land", where things are clean, and start from almost scratch again; and that (3) In time, and with God on our side and with honorable intentions and hard work and honesty among ourselves and faith in beauty's righteousness, the whole world is either going to turn on, or blow up.⁴⁵

While those seeking refuge in the country wrestle with anxiety, paranoia, and pessimism by submerging themselves in primitive toil and the struggle with the elements (a kind of pastoral purification), their city bretheren find simplicity

...not in bare rural isolation, but in the simplification of a fresh sense of direction that comes from the pursuit of some fanatical-seeming ideal or from some special expression of a new religious discipline, either of which they are wont to sieze [sic.] upon with all the fervid zeal of famished animals.⁴⁶

The turn toward religion is by no means confined to urban members of the counter culture. While visiting various communes in California, I encountered what can only be described as a wholesale religious revival among many of the counter culture groups in that state. The religious members of the counter culture to whom I spoke all shared what seemed to be a fatalistic view of human existence: instead of seeking to transform the existing social order, in accordance with Reich's expectations, the element of the counter culture appears to be turning inward toward self-absolution and personal salvation.

A theme which was repeated to me again and again by different individuals on rural communes was that the "old civilization" (everyone not living on rural communes) is rapidly destroying itself by pollution, overpopulation, and through the addition of "un-natural" chemicals to its food supply. If a cataclysm does not result from these factors, then many of the people I spoke to believe that it must come through an inevitable nuclear holocaust. In either event, they believe that this will leave those who must depend upon advanced technology and those who are accustomed to "luxurious living" vulnerable to extinction. It was surprising to encounter this theme and its variations in response to almost every instance of asking communards about the purposes underlying their return to primitivism and their veneration of Indian-lore and survival skills.

Members of communes centered around Pentacostal religions usually offered a variation of the above theme. For them, there was no "survival" after the holocaust; instead, they envisioned the more conventional "day of judgement."

My visits to various communes and the talks which I had with counter culture individuals throughout the summer of 1970 in no way constitutes "scientific" research. However, I feel that the impressions that I gathered of the counter culture throughout Northern California, as subjective and unsystematic as they are, severely call into

question Reich and Roszak's portrayal of that movement. For this reason, I present a few illustrations of what I feel to be the most representative findings resulting from that summer's research.

Many of the young in the counter culture view modern life as being too complicated and bewildering, too competitive, and too anxiety-ridden for them to deal with or take part in. Their devotion to fundamentalist religions and their isolation on rural communes seems to remove a great deal of ambiguity from their lives: roles, rules, and responsibilities become clearly delineated either by the necessities of daily survival or by scripture. The constrictions which these rules and status hierarchies place upon young people's lives directly controverts significant elements of Reich's characterization of the counter culture. In addition, these hierarchies often lead to subservient relationships. The following case is an example of a type of male domination which many Consciousness II women seem to be rejecting more strongly than ever before.

"Dinadayadri Dasi" is the name which the "Hare Krishna" movement assigned to a young high-school drop-out from Ferndale, Michigan. Dinadayadri said that before learning to "spiritualize" the atmosphere by chanting the name of the god "Krishna" she had been a long-time user of LSD and other hallucinogens. The chanting of "Krishna" helps to drive away "Maya"--the illusion that the physical world

is real--and has eliminated the fear and uncertainty which she associates with her "pre-Krishna" existence.

What effect "Krishna" chanting has had upon Dinadayadri's feelings of insecurity is hard to determine. However, there are a number of fundamental beliefs and institutional arrangements in the movement which could easily account for the reduction of uncertainty and the lowering of anxiety which Dinadayadri describes. Marriage, for instance, is required of the female members of Dinadayadri's sect--a husband is assigned to each woman. Some idea of the Krishna movement's organizational premises can be gleaned from the comments made by Dinadayadri concerning the role of women in the movement:

A woman's only purpose is to serve her husband. Women have been conditioned to think they are equal to men, but living entities that take a female body are always inferior to those that take the male body. I am like a cow. But it is a very nice thing to be called a cow, because they are holy and Krishna loves them.⁴⁷

Other regulations which were mentioned by Dinadayadri were: the prohibition of sexual intercourse, except for the proagation of children; abstinence from tobacco, alcohol, and all other drugs; and bans on the consumption of meat, fish, and eggs.⁴⁸

Although we do not attempt to establish a causal nexus between heavy drug-use and anomie, the findings of my interviews may indicate that for some individuals, the use of hallucinogens may produce a feeling of detachment, loneliness and anxiety which motivates a turn towards

religion. Many individuals mentioned a "search" involving extensive drug use (particularly of LSD, mescaline, and peyote) in connection with their conversion to a religious position.⁴⁹ One girl described the drug experience which preceded her conversion as "...looking at the world through the wrong end of a telescope--and at yourself through a microscope."⁵⁰

At Table Bluff, in Humboldt County, an old lighthouse station has kitchen facilities as well as barracks which can accommodate about fifty young people. This is the site of the Lighthouse Ranch commune which has distributed a brochure reading:

Seven acres of God's earth dedicated to sharing the good news of a new life in Jesus the Christ as revealed in the Holy Scripture. If you desire to learn of Jesus and to work with us you are welcome.⁵¹

The residents of Lighthouse Ranch include veterans of heavy drug-use and young runaways from as far away as Boston and Philadelphia. Christine, a former art student from the Boston Museum School of Art, says,

I'm convinced that the Lord brought me here. I've been looking for Jesus for a long time. When I walked in here a few weeks ago I said that this is where I belong. I went the LSD route for a while, but drugs are not the way. If you're confused it is Jesus, not drugs, who gives you peace.⁵²

When asked about future plans for the commune, some members expressed a desire to buy the property, which they now rent, but the overall feeling of the group was encapsulated by one young girl who said;

We don't worry about the future. It has to be day by day with the Lord. It's the now that's important and its beautiful.⁵³

Neighboring farmers employ some of the members of the commune and have also donated food and clothing from time to time. When there are no jobs available at local ranches or in the local community there are numerous tasks to be done on the commune itself, cleaning, cooking, collecting firewood, caring for the animals, and working in the vegetable garden. A few of the commune's members are enrolled in various courses at the community college and at Humboldt State College in an attempt to acquire skills that will earn them a place on the local job market. All wages are pooled in a communal fund which goes for paying the rent of \$200 per month and purchasing supplies.

The comment which is common to just about all the individuals interviewed is that their lives were made meaningful and worthwhile by their turn to Jesus after a period of lonely searching which included drug-use and experimentation with mysticism and other religions.

The turn toward religion seems to add a sense of "legitimacy" and purpose to the lives of many members of the counter culture. Jesus people see Christ as the first "hippie" and claim that their life-style is more in keeping with His teachings than the "conventional" North American life-styles. Individuals defend their

life-styles by noting that "Jesus had long hair too." The members of religious communes have given up the loitering and idleness which characterized the Haight-Ashbury "street people" and devote themselves to energetic proselytization-- "doing the Lord's work."

"Jesus people" renounce drugs, sexual promiscuity and eroticism in language and dress. This renunciation, combined with their fervent Bible-reading and quotation of scripture, seems to provide common ground for interaction between the Jesus people and members of orthodox Christian denominations in the surrounding community. In order to find particular rural communes, it was necessary to speak with citizens of neighbouring villages and to ask for directions at ranch houses. There was never any hostility indicated toward Jesus communes in response to my inquiries, while, on the other hand, derogatory remarks were often volunteered concerning the non-religious ("hippie") communes.

The willingness to live from day to day in poverty, and to accept hardships as God's Will, makes the Jesus people an excellent labour pool to fill those jobs which are too sporadic and low-paying to support even the transient labour associated with harvesting, logging, and mining. These jobs, such as weeding, thinning orchards, bailing hay, cleaning brush, etc., abound in rural ranching areas such as Humboldt County. Although it would be impossible for the head of a household to support a family on this work, the Jesus people will do such things as help a farmer kill and pluck his chickens in return for

a donation of stewing hens and cracked eggs. Given this kind of contribution to the transient-labour market, it is difficult to envision the collapse of the present order due to the growth of the Jesus movement.

The ecstatic fervour of working with others for "the Lord" seems to provide motivation that was previously lacking for some of the disoriented drop-outs. They go back to school and study, or perform other very unpleasant tasks, with the encouragement and support of the other members of the commune. They know that although laziness is not tolerated, they will not be punished or scorned for failures, and that any contribution they make to the community will be both genuinely needed and appreciated.

Tasks are performed as a group whenever possible, there is mutual encouragement, and hymns are sung while working. "Praise the Lord," someone is always saying, and they are always answered by a chorus of "Right-on, brother," or "Amen, sister." The mutual support of individual members by the group is one of the most striking features of most of the Jesus communes which I visited. Perhaps the religious commune can be viewed as a "supportive mechanism" which facilitates the partial re-entry of counter culture members into the existing social order.

Although the material presented above is not part of a comprehensive and rigorous empirical investigation of the counter culture, it is hoped that it does elucidate and remedy, to some degree, the major shortcomings of Reich

and Roszak's characterization of the counter culture. In addition to the definitional concerns, the material presented above has been directed toward five major elements of the counter culture which seem to be neglected or inadequately treated by Reich and Roszak:

1) The question of drug use in the counter culture: in terms of particular psychological and physiological hazards to individuals; the relationship between drug use and conflict; and, concerning the possible implications and consequences it has or has had upon the character of the counter culture.

2) The complexity and diversity of the counter culture: The counter culture as a social movement is glossed over by Reich and Roszak. The effects of such things as conflict and drug use appear to be deepening the diversity of the counter culture as individuals struggle for viable modes of existence within the confines of the prevailing social structure.

3) Reich and Roszak's treatment of conflict seems inadequate in the light of findings concerning the widespread harassment and persecution of the counter culture. This began as early as April, 1967, and should have been known to Reich and Roszak.

4) Reich and Roszak do not deal with the rural communes, or with the possible significance of the religious revival among the counter culture. We suggest that these

should be seen as responses to a variety of circumstances, conditions, and events; including, perhaps, alienation, anomie, anxiety, conflicts, drug use, and the like. The counter culture seems to have a built-in vulnerability, in that the rejection of organization, programs for action, and long-range goals makes it difficult to oppose even loosely organized antagonists.

5) Finally, I have attempted to indicate that there is a fundamental schism between the optimistic and idyllic counter culture proffered by Reich and Roszak, and the pessimistic, and sometimes apocalyptic, counter culture made up of individuals who may be alienated, discouraged, and intensely lonely. I believe that my experiences and the findings of other researchers, which are set out above, lend more credence to the later characterization than to the former. The findings of my own limited research also seem to support the characterization of the counter culture as a regenerative movement based upon "Consciousness I" ideals, rather than as a movement representing some new stage of "controlled technology."

I must repeat again, at the risk of overstatement, that the findings presented here are tentative and include speculations based upon very limited and unsystematic research. They are intended primarily as contrasts to the material presented by Reich and Roszak which neglects some considerations altogether, or offers superficial

treatments which are controverted or called into question by even a preliminary investigation such as this.

The criticism and analysis which has been presented in this thesis does not constitute an incontrovertible refutation of Reich and Roszak's predictions. A final assessment of these predictions must await the passage of time; for only the future will reveal the impact, if any, that the counter culture has upon North American society. What has been demonstrated in this thesis, I believe, is that Reich and Roszak's contributions are woefully inadequate in terms of 1) consistency of thought; 2) logical rigour; and 3) to the extent that our limited findings indicate, in terms of the accuracy of several major descriptive components. In light of these shortcomings, we conclude that an abandonment of traditional politics in favour of "revolution by consciousness" would be premature in the extreme on the basis of the material presented in The Greening of America and The Making of a Counter Culture.

Footnotes - Chapter V

¹ Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," Principles of Sociology, ed. Alfred McClung Lee (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1953), pp. 214-18.

² For examples of Reich's usage of these general characteristics to denote the counter culture, see The Greening of America, pages 240, 254-56, 340, 353-55, and 428. On page 300, however, he notes that these outer manifestations only reflect a deeper set of non-material values.

³ Reich's predictions call for Consciousness III to control science and technology, yet the counter culture seems to reject the analytic thought and scientific skills which would make this possible. Reich's only response to this dilemma is the assurance that "...this is only a transitional stage." (Reich, op. cit., p. 400).

⁴ Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1969), p. 74.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., p. 38.

⁷ Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970), pp. 240-60.

⁸ Ibid., p. 243.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ It should be noted in passing that although the absence of intersubjective evaluative standards might make agreement upon individual evaluations of others difficult, it does not make evaluations of others on subjective grounds impossible. Consciousness III individuals may very well refrain from evaluating or competing with others, but this is not a necessary consequence of value-relativism as outlined by Reich. Feeling inferior or superior to others is quite compatible with value-relativism, in fact, if rejecting the concept of 'excellence' made such evaluations impossible, as Reich seems to suggest, what basis would there be for the self-esteem which is implied by Reich's statement "Everyone is entitled to pride in himself"?

¹¹ Reich, op. cit., p. 241.

- 12 Roszak, op. cit., p.42.
- 13 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
- 14 Reich, op. cit., chapter XI.
- 15 Ibid., p. 259.
- 16 See Roszak, op. cit., pages 82-83, 233-38, 240, and especially pages 256 through 258.
- 17 Reich, op. cit., p. 289.
- 18 Ibid., p. 244.
- 19 Ibid., p. 242.
- 20 Peter Marin, "The Greening of America: A somber view of a Cheerful View of the Future," in the New York Times Book Review, (November 8, 1970), p. 3.
- 21 Ibid., p. 58.
- 22 For an excellent satirical treatment of male chauvinism in the counter culture, see R. Crumb's Fritz the Cat (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969).
- 23 Roszak, op. cit., p. 156.
- 24 ...Leary, appearing at just the ripe moment and gaining ready access to thousands of college students and adolescents, has been the figure primarily responsible for inculcating upon vast numbers of young and needy minds (many of which do not easily hold more than one idea at a time) the primer-simple notion that LSD has "something" to do with religion.(Roszak, op. cit., p. 166.)

Roszak devotes the entire chapter entitled "The Counterfeit Infinity" to the condemnation of drug-use and berates the young for naively believing that the universal use of drugs will change the world.

But the trouble is: dope is not simply an excrement that can be surgically removed from our youth culture by indignant rejection. Leary and his followers have succeeded in endowing it with such a mystique that it now seems the very essence of that politics of the nervous system in which

the young are so deeply involved. (Roszak, p.167.)

Reports of "religious experiences" and of feeling "at-one" with the universe, etc., were commonplace long before Leary's self-styled bid for Guru-status. Leary's religious-pitch does not seem so much a cause of LSD use in the counter culture as a simultaneous event. The prevalence of religious terminology in connection with drug-use in the counter culture can be easily explained in terms of the magnitude of the effect that hallucinogens have upon perception and the mental processes--when the readily agreed-upon language that we use to label the everyday world proves inadequate to describe an intense but highly subjective mental state, is it surprising that the young resort to the language of religion and mysticism?

25 Don McNeill, Moving Through Here (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p.154. The material in this book originally appeared in the Village Voice in the years 1966 through 1968. Some idea of McNeill's credentials can be had from the introduction by Allen Ginsberg and the epilogue contributed by Paul Williams.

26 For examples of the counter culture's rejection of "rationality," see Reich, op. cit., pages 241 and 278. Roszak discusses this aspect of the counter culture in chapters two and five of The Making of a Counter Culture.

27 See Reich, op. cit., pp. 381-83.

28 Ibid., p. 378.

29 Michael Brown, "The Condemnation and Persecution of Hippies," in Trans-Action, September, 1969, p. 36.

30 McNeill, op. cit., p. 209.

31 Brown, op. cit., p. 36.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid. In San Francisco, California, I spoke with individuals who experienced this attitude of non-intervention on the part of police. One individual related how his wife had been raped by a man who held a gun to her head in Golden Gate Park. When they attempted to report the incident, the police laughed, saying "You hippies don't have any morals anyway."

34 Ibid., p. 33.

35 From 1967 through 1969.

36 The anticipated migration of half a million hippies never materialized, although the Haight-Ashbury community was estimated to number about seven to ten thousand persons, with a very high turnover rate. See Fred Davis, "Why All of Us May Be Hippies Someday," in Trans-Action, December, 1967, p. 10.

37 The Diggers were an English communist sect which arose in 1649.

38 Fred Davis, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

39 Brown, op. cit., p. 36.

40 Marin, op. cit., p. 3.

41 Ibid.

42 For an interesting view of the counter culture's experiences with the stringent enforcement of county health and building codes in Northern California, see the San Francisco Chronicle, July 27 and 28, 1970, p. 4; and the Eureka Times-Standard, August 1 and 3, 1970, p. 9.

43 This information was forwarded by Mr. Jeremy Wilson, caretaker for the Hill Ranch, Big Sur, California; and by Mr. Robert Kelley, long-time resident of Big Sur.

44 William Hedgepeth and Dennis Stock, The Alternative: Communal Life in New America (London: Collier Books, 1970).

45 Ibid., p. 23.

46 Ibid., p. 122.

47 From an interview with a number of chanting people in Sproul Plaza, University of California, at Berkeley, 1970.

48 Male members of the "Hare Krishna movement wear saffron robes and shave the head. Dinadayadri Dasi wore a caste mark, traditional Indian gown, and a small gold chain which

connected a small ring in her nose to a similar one in her left earlobe.

49 A member of a Jesus commune near Ferndale, California said that his conversion followed a "miracle" which occurred after a prayer session with a Christian. The "miracle" took place while he was under the influence of mescaline. A partial transcript of his account of the conversion is presented below:

I was into an India trip....I was talking to this Christian cat...he talked me into praying with him --to Jesus, ya know--and we got down on our knees (I kinda dug that), and I prayed to Jesus to show me....

The next day, I had taken some mescaline and was sitting in the woods....sitting in meditation. I had a picture of my Guru sitting on a rock, there was no wind at all, but the wind blew it away.... I changed.

50 From an interview in Eureka, California, July, 1970.

51 Mimeographed brochure.

52 From an interview on Lighthouse Ranch Commune, August, 1970.

53 Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Major Works: The Basis for Analysis

Reich, Charles A. The Greening of America. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970.

Roszak, Theodore. The Making of a Counter Culture. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1969.

B. Works on the Counter Culture

Berger, Bennett M. "Hippie Morality-More Old Than New." Trans-action, December, 1967, pp. 19-27.

Davis, Fred. "Why All of Us May Be Hippies Someday." Trans-action, December, 1967, pp. 10-18.

Marin, Peter. "The Greening of America." New York Times Book Review, November, 1970, p. 3.

Simmon, Geoffrey, and Trout, Grafton. "Hippies in College-From Teeny-boppers to Drug Freaks." Trans-action, December, 1967, pp. 27-32.

Wallich, Henry C. "Consuming Youth." Newsweek, March, 1971, p. 75.

C. General Works

Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by T.A. Sinclair. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962.

Cantril, Hadley. The Psychology of Social Movements. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1967.

Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. Translated by John Wilkinson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964.

Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton, 1961.

Galbraith, John Kenneth. The New Industrial State. New York: Signet Books, The New American Library, Inc., 1967.

Harris, Nigel. Beliefs in Society. Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1971.

Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. New York: Harper and Row, 1951.

Lichtheim, George. The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. New York: Random House, 1967.

Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936.

Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. Basic Writing on Politics and Philosophy. Edited by Lewis S. Feuer. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959.

McNeill, Don. Moving Through Here. New York: Lancer Books, 1970.

Plato. The Republic. Translated by McDonald Cornford. London: Oxford University Press, 1941.

Reisman, David. The Lonely Crowd. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

Rokeach, Milton. Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969.

Whyte, William H. The Organization Man. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1920.

D. Works on Revolution and Social Change

Blumer, Herbert. "Collective Behavior." Principles of Sociology. Edited by Alfred McClung Lee. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1953.

Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York: Ronald Press, 1958.

Davies, James C. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American Sociological Review, XXVII (February, 1962).

Feirabend, Ivo K., and Feirabend, Rosalind L. "Aggressive Behavior Within Politics." Journal of Conflict Resolution, (September, 1966).

Freud, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. New York: Bantam Books, 1960.

Gurr, Ted. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife." American Political Science Review, LXI (December, 1968).

Johnson, Chalmers A. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961.

Le Bon, Gustave. The Crowd. New York: Ballantine Books, 1969.

- Nicolaus, Martin. "The Unknown Marx." New Left Review, No. 48 (March-April, 1968), p. 42.
- Pye, Lucian. "The Roots of Insurgency." Internal War. Edited by Harry Eckstein. New York: The Free Press, 1964, p. 163.
- Sorel, Georges. Reflection on Violence. London: Collier Books, 1950.
- Sweezy, Paul M. The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1942.
- Tanter, Raymond, and Midlarsky, Manus. "A Theory of Revolution." Journal of Conflict Resolution, XXXI (September, 1967).
- Wolfenstein, Victor E. The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Ghandi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

B30010